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ABSTRACT
The law of personal jurisdiction lies at the heart of all litigation. 2 Our courts must recognize
the rights of individuals as well as the rights of corporations. The motto placed at the entrance of
the United States Supreme Court—“Equal Justice Under Law”—ensures the promise of equal
justice under the law to all persons. 3 It expresses the ultimate responsibility of the Supreme Court
of the United States (the “Court”) as the highest tribunal for all cases and controversies arising
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States and functions as a guardian and
interpreter of the Constitution. 4 From the perspective of fairness, an individual needs protection
without compromising a corporate defendant’s goals in advancing its business.
The Court’s recent decisions in (1) Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 5 (2)
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 6 (3) J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 7 (4) BNSF Railway Co. v.

2

See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 (7th ed. 2008) [hereinafter YEAZELL].

3

The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited August 2017).
4

Id.

5

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).

6

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).

7

J. McIntyre Mach, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).

3
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Tyrrell, 8 and (5) Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. San Francisco Cty. 9raise
serious need for re-routing courts’ approaches to personal jurisdiction because majority approaches
were biased against individuals and were inconsistent with the Court’s motto. The Court never
adequately considered the difference between corporations of the pre-industrial era and those of
the modern-industrial era. Many modern-era corporate structures are extremely complex and often
expand into the global market by organizing themselves in an orb-web formation. 10 Hence, the
current analysis of jurisdictional law is the incorrect way to determine personal jurisdiction. To
address this problem, this article explains the structure of orb-web corporations and offers three
approaches to personal jurisdiction, emphasizing a presence model based on the birthplace of an
orb-web corporation. This article advocates how our jurisdictional law can be re-routed to enhance
fairness, all while assuring the Court’s motto in an orb-web corporation’s setting. 11
I. A TOUCHSTONE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS
A. Established Models of Personal Jurisdiction
Our Constitution requires that a forum state must have power over an out-of-state corporate
defendant before the forum state or federal court located within the state can compel the defendant
to come to the state to defend a lawsuit. 12 The power theory rests on two prongs: (1) the due
process, 13 and (2) notice. 14 Theoretically, state courts assert due process through two established
models followed by proper and adequate notice: 15 (1) presence model, 16 or (2) minimum contacts
model. 17 Federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction and in addition to
8

BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct 1549 (2017).

9

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. Cal. San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)

10

See infra Part I.C.

11

See discussion infra Parts I -IV; see McIntyre, 864 U.S. at 892 (Breyer J., concurring) (“the fact that the
defendant is a foreign, rather than a domestic, manufacturer makes the basic fairness of an absolute rule yet more
uncertain...the nature of international commerce has changed so significantly as to require a new approach to personal
jurisdiction.”); see also Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see infra
text and accompanying note 261.
12

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (stating that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”).
13

Id.; PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAW: CASES AND MATERIAL 119 (13th ed. 2012) [hereinafter PETER
HAY] (“The personal jurisdiction of the State court is limited by Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
for federal courts, however, the relevant Due Process is the one found in Fifth Amendment.”).
14

See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).

15

Id. at 313-14.

16

See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (emphasizing physical presence within the forum’s
boundary), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 188 (1977).
17

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1945).
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exercising personal jurisdiction, they also require subject matter jurisdiction satisfying either (a)
federal question jurisdiction 18 or (b) diversity jurisdiction. 19
In the presence model, a corporate defendant must (1) be incorporated in the forum state;
(2) have consented or waived to the forum state’s jurisdiction, (3) have assets or property in the
forum state; or (4) have its principal place of business in the forum state. 20 If a corporate defendant
satisfies any of the prongs in the presence model, then the state courts, at least theoretically, can
assert “general jurisdiction” 21 over such defendants. 22 General jurisdiction is defined as a court’s
“power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or
indirect, between the forum and the person whose legal rights are to be affected.” 23 General
jurisdiction asserted through the presence model is a direct approach against a corporate defendant
for the cause of action arising anywhere in the world.
On the other hand, in the minimum contacts model (i) exercise of jurisdiction must be
authorized by a state’s long-arm statute; (ii) the state’s long-arm statute must be consistent with
the United States Constitution; and (iii) a corporate defendant must have purposeful contact with
the forum state. 24 If a state’s long-arm statute is unlimited, then the forum state can exercise
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate defendant to which it has connection or no connection
at all. 25 In short, “the exercise of jurisdiction must not offend traditional notion of fair play and
substantial justice.” 26
In addition, if a non-resident-corporate defendant’s contact is purposeful, then under
established models, specific or general jurisdiction can be asserted. The prevailing law states that
specific jurisdiction is asserted when “affiliations between [a] forum and the underlying
controversy normally support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or
connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate.” 27

18

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

19

28 U.S.C. § 1332.

20

Lecture Note: Professor Charles P. Cercone, Thomas M. Cooley Law School, Civil Procedure I (Spring
2011) [hereinafter Professor Cercone].
21

See infra text accompanying notes 21-30.

22

See YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 56-58.

23

See Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966); see also Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66, TEX. L.
REV. 721, 727-28 (1988) (stating that professors Von Mehren & Trautman spelled the difference but did not specify
which contacts might support general jurisdiction and which might establish specific jurisdiction).
24

Professor Cercone, supra note 20.

25

Id.

26

Int’l Shoe, 339 U.S. at 316.

27

See Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1136.
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General jurisdiction asserted through the minimum contacts model is an indirect approach
between a corporate defendant and the forum state. 28 In the early era, the state’s long-arm statute
and minimum contacts are designed to protect a state court’s arbitrary assertion of jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants. Today, in essence, the presence model protects only out-of-state corporate
defendants’ interests unless corporate defendants are incorporated or have a principal place of
business in the United States so as to satisfy “continuous and systematic operations, which is
essentially regarded as home.” 29 Although preferred justification for the minimum contacts model
does not require actual presence, the Court’s empirical component rests on the phrase “essentially
at home.” 30
This phrase suggests that general jurisdiction can be asserted through either the presence
or the minimum contacts model, but specific jurisdiction can only be asserted through the minimum
contacts model. In addition, the minimum contacts model adapted by the Court subverted an
indirect approach of general jurisdiction in the state courts. Thus, the Court allegedly overlapped
two different jurisdictional models in general jurisdiction cases.
As a result, asserting general jurisdiction through either the presence or the minimum
contacts model is very confusing and problematic to the courts and practitioners. 31 Ironically, these
models stem from two early era cases involving property law and a corporate agent’s activity in
the forum State: Pennoyer v. Neff 32 and International Shoe v. Washington. 33
Under the minimum contacts model, the Court has articulated that due process requires a
non-resident corporation to establish meaningful contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state,
which provide fair warning that a particular activity may subject the non-resident corporate
defendant to the state’s jurisdiction. 34 The Due Process Clause “gives a degree of predictability to
the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” 35
28

See supra text accompanying notes 11-26.

29

See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1560 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
30

See id.; Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1560-61 (Sotomayor J. concurring in part and dissenting in part and stating that
“[w]hat was once a holistic, nuanced contacts analysis backed by considerations of fairness and reasonableness has
now effectively been replaced by the rote identification of a corporation’s principal place of business or place of
incorporation…. It is individual plaintiffs, harmed by the actions of a far-flung foreign corporation, who will bear the
brunt of…[this] approach and be forced to sue in distant jurisdiction.”).
31

See, e.g., McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877-78 (describing the lower courts’ analysis as confused); Bristol-Meyers
Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (“the California Supreme Court's ‘sliding scale approach’ is difficult to square with our
precedents. Under the California approach, the strength of the requisite connection between the forum and the specific
claims at issue is relaxed if the defendant has extensive forum contacts that are unrelated to those claims. Our cases
provide no support for this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”)
32

See discussion infra Part.I.A.1.

33

See discussion infra Part.I.A.2.

34

Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).

35

World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1979).
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Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, sister states must respect and enforce the judgment
rendered by a forum state against foreign defendants unless the forum state does not have the
power over an absent, out-of-state, or foreign defendant. 36 States must provide equal access to their
courts for claims based on federal law if state courts would otherwise have jurisdiction under local
jurisdictional rules. 37 In addition, under the Equal Protection Clause, corporations are persons. 38
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the rights of life,
liberty, and property “cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate
procedures.” 39 Therefore, a state court cannot compel a nonresident defendant to come to the forum
state to defend a lawsuit. 40 To that end, the Due Process Clause gives a defendant subjected to an
unfair assertion of jurisdiction the right to attack that attempted assertion of jurisdiction. 41 The
courts equally share important roles for domestic and international litigation for extended
36

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1(requiring that a State must give to the judgment of sister States the same effect
that such judgments have in the State of retention); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (suggesting that the federal court must
give full faith and credit to the State court’s judgment)
37

See Lea Brilmayer and Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for Constitutional
Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and Conflict of Laws, 39 VA. L. REV 819, 826 (1983).
38

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966) (stating that States of the Union are not persons
for Due Process purposes), abrogated by Shelby Cty. of Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
39

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).

40

Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); NELSON P. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN PRACTICE
35 (1st ed. 2011) [hereinafter PROFESSOR MILLER] (stating that “under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a State must
recognize another State’s judgment unless the first court, which delivers the judgment over the defendant, has no
personal jurisdiction.”).
41

Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menfee, 237 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1915). The Riverside Court stated

that
[T]he enforcement of due process under the 14th Amendment was without influence upon the power
to render the judgment, since that limitation was pertinent only to the determination of when and
how the judgment, after it was rendered, could be enforced. But this doctrine, while admitting the
operation of the due process clause, simply declines to make it effective. That is to say, it recognizes
the right to invoke the protection of the clause, but denies its remedial efficiency by postponing its
operation, and thus permitting that to be done which, if the constitutional guaranty were applied,
would be absolutely prohibited. Nevertheless, the obvious answer to the proposition is that wherever
a provision of the Constitution is applicable, the duty to enforce it is imperative and all embracing,
and no act, which it forbids, may therefore be permitted. The enforcement of due process under the
14th Amendment was without influence upon the power to render the judgment, since that limitation
was pertinent only to the determination of when and how the judgment, after it was rendered, could
be enforced. However, this doctrine, while admitting the operation of the due process clause, simply
declines to make it effective. That is to say, it recognizes the right to invoke the protection of the
clause, but denies its remedial efficiency by postponing its operation, and thus permitting that to be
done which, if the constitutional guaranty were applied, would be absolutely prohibited. But the
obvious answer to the proposition is that wherever a provision of the Constitution is applicable, the
duty to enforce it is imperative and all-embracing, and no act which it forbids may therefore be
permitted. Id.
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availability of damages for intangible harm, flexible discovery rules, punitive damages, and fair
jury trial. 42
These established rules suggest that a corporation and an individual should be treated the
43
same. As applied to orb-web corporations, however, this seems to be an incorrect analysis of our
personal jurisdiction laws. 44 Orb-web corporations are born in the United States, generally expand
to other states, cross the nation’s boundaries, and acquire property while availing themselves of
the benefit and protection of United States’ laws. 45 Thus, an orb-web corporation cannot argue that
defending a lawsuit in the United States is burdensome, or that it has been discriminated against. 46
Yet state courts have also increasingly relied on an incorrect application and analysis of
these confusing precedents cases. 47 In addition, general and specific jurisdiction under the
minimum contacts model is a significant contributor to the unmeaningful outcome of cases in state
courts. 48 As a result, state courts have incorporated these two analyses in each case to determine
personal jurisdiction, leading to confusion in jurisdictional law. 49 To begin with, this article
examines the Court’s pre-industrial era cases and their implications in present time.
1. Pennoyer v. Neff
In an early nineteenth century case, Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court used a direct assertion of
jurisdiction and addressed an issue of sovereignty and introduced the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in personal jurisdiction analysis. 50 The Court adopted a conservative
theory and held that a state possessed exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory and that no state should exercise “direct” jurisdiction and authority

42

PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 38, para. 3.

43

See supra text and accompanying notes 34-40.

44

See sources cited, supra notes 4-8.

45

See infra diagram 1, p. 24.

46

See also Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571-72 (1949) (“After a State has chosen to
domesticate foreign corporations, the adopted corporations are entitled to equal protection with the State’s own
corporate progeny, at least to the extent that their property is entitled to an equally favorable ad valorem tax basis.”).
47

See, e.g., Noll v. American Biltrite Inc., 395 P.3d 1021, 1026 (Wash. 2017) (“General jurisdiction requires
extensive and systematic contacts with the forum state.” (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923-24)); Volkswagen
Aktiengesellschaft v. Jones, 2017 WL 2180984, No. 2D15-5716, *6 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017) (stating that the plaintiff
personally and unilaterally brought the car purchased from the defendant from New York to Florida and the “unilateral
activity of another party or a third person is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant
has sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an assertion of jurisdiction.” (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408,
417 (1984)).
48

See sources cited in supra notes 4-8

49

See id.

50

See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
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over persons or property beyond its territory. 51 The Court emphasized that every state owed
protections to non-resident corporations having any property in the forum state. 52
Since Pennoyer, when a non-resident defendant’s property is within a state’s border, a state
or federal court in that jurisdiction has the power to adjudicate any kind of controversy related to
that property. 53 The presence of assets or property provides a basis for adjudicating any claims
against the defendant. 54 Thus, Pennoyer emphasized the states’ volitional conduct, limited due
process rights, and rigid standard to assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants (and, of
course, over the orb-web corporations). It is fair to say that the presence model mainly stemmed
from Pennoyer. 55
2. International Shoe v. Washington
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 56 on the other hand, the Court used an indirect
assertion method and addressed the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
International Shoe, the defendant, a Delaware corporation, was amenable to proceedings in the
Washington state court to recover unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation
fund enacted under state statute. 57 The Court held that the state court could assert personal
jurisdiction over a Delaware corporation, which had its principal place of business in St. Louis,
Missouri. 58 Although the corporate defendant was not registered to do business in Washington, it
maintained business in several states other than in Washington. 59
Additionally, the defendant did not have an office in Washington, did not have contracts
for either sale or purchase of merchandise, and it did not stock any merchandise in the forum
state. 60 The defendant did not make any deliveries to the forum state in interstate commerce. 61 The
defendant only employed eleven of its employees under the corporation’s direct supervision and
control, who resided in Washington and rented office or hotel space for exhibiting samples for that
51

Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722-23 (stating that a State may obtain jurisdiction over defendants as long as they
are subject to the State’s physical power. A State derives its physical power from its status as an independent sovereign,
which possesses and imposes authority over persons or property within its borders.).
52

YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 64; FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).

53

Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.

54

Id.

55

Professor Cercone, supra note 20.

56

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.

57

Id. at 311.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 313.

60

Id. at 313.

61

Id.
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purpose. 62 The State argued that the corporation must pay tax to the state unemployment fund, as
it was doing business in the State of Washington, but International Shoe argued that if the
corporation had to pay taxes to Washington then it had to pay taxes to every states in which it did
business. 63
In sum, the Court created a new theory that a defendant must have “certain minimum
contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 64 The Court added that a non-resident corporate
defendant’s contact with a forum state must be reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit; and an “estimate of the
inconveniences” to a corporation having to litigate away from its “home” or principal place of
business is a relevant consideration. 65
Corporations are fictions; therefore, corporate activities must be carried through its
66
agents. Accordingly, either corporate agents’ presence or activities within the forum state satisfy
due process. 67 States may thus make binding in personam judgments against individuals or
corporate defendants if states have some contacts, ties, or relations. 68
3. Takeaway from These Historical Cases
International Shoe’s main revolution was giving states the ability to reach out-of-state
defendants through their long-arm statutes. 69 In addition, the Court recognized the presence of a
corporation by the presence of its agents. 70 On the other hand, the Pennoyer rationale is simple: A
state has the power over persons and things within its borders, but a state cannot sue an out-ofstate defendant beyond its borders. 71 Pennoyer only focused on physical presence of persons or
properties within state borders. Whereas International Shoe sought to expand the jurisdiction of a
state court with liberal interpretation of the Due Process Clause and advocated a mere flexible
standard of fairness by setting an example of a corporation’s behaviors and relationship with its
62

Id. at 314.

63

Id. at 318.

64

Id. at 316.

65

Id.

66

See id. at 316-17.

67

Id. at 317 (stating, however, that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even the agent’s single or
isolated activities in a State on the corporation’s behalf were not enough to subject the corporation to suit on causes
of action unrelated with activities in the forum State).
68

Id. at 319.

69

See discussion supra Part I.A.2

70

See supra text accompanying notes 56-67.

71

See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722-23.
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domestic units. 72
In International Shoe, the Court initiated five possible theories that fall within the presence
model: (a) consent, (b) agency, (c) doing business, (d) state of incorporation, and (e) principal
place of business. 73 In addition, it also activated a minimum contacts model. Although the presence
and minimum contacts models stemmed from these two cases, neither Pennoyer nor International
Shoe provided any appropriate guidance for orb-web corporations because in Pennoyer and
International Shoe, the defendant was an individual or a single corporation with limited business
activities.
Although both Pennoyer and International Shoe provided remarkable tools for a corporate
defendant, the Court impermissibly blended the presence and minimum contacts models to
determine general jurisdiction in subsequent cases. Pennoyer was decided in the pre-industrial era
without modern transportation or communications, and International Shoe was decided with a
more modern approach. 74
4. Inconsistent Approaches of Due Process
The Due Process Clause focuses on the relation among defendant, forum, and litigation in
tort cases. 75 The case law certainly suggests that a non-resident corporate defendant can be sued
far from and without the minimum contacts with the forum state. 76 Even though states have strong
interests in exercising their tort laws, recent cases such as Goodyear, McIntyre, Bauman, BristolMyers Squibb, and Tyrrell have interpreted jurisdiction in such a way that precludes the states from
providing effective means of redressing those harms corporate defendants have caused to their
citizens. 77 The Court has interpreted due process to be applied to each defendant’s action
individually so that each defendant’s contacts with the forum must be purposeful if a state is to
reach that defendant. 78 In recent cases, the Court failed to acknowledge that the Court’s precedent

72

See infra text accompanying notes 63-64. In International Shoe, the corporation had only one unit that was
at issue; however, this theory did not provide any solution for orb-web corporations.
73

See supra text accompanying notes 56-67. Cf. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778 (majority
opinion) (describing that the corporation does business in California by stating that “BMS does sell Plavix in
California. Between 2006 and 2012, it sold almost 187 million Plavix pills in the State and took in more than $900
million from those sales.”).
74

See YEAZELL, supra note 1, at 71.

75

Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at
1781 (majority opinion) (describing that plaintiffs must be the forum state residents and must claim to have suffered
harm in that forum. In short, some sort of causation is required).
76

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.

77

See supra Part I.A; see also discussion infra Parts II-IV.

78

Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984) (describing “jurisdiction over a parent
corporation automatically establishes jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary.”).
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cases involved a single corporate defendant, but have not involved an orb-web or a multinational
corporation. 79 Thus, the current theory of fairness is vague at the best.
In addition, the U.S. Constitution gives each state the power to tax and open its courts to
its citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business within its borders. 80 A tort claim generally
occurs wherever an offending product or material is distributed or circulated. 81 Generally, due
process does not intend to oust traditional tort law or liability for injuries, but it should be
interpreted along with the federal rules, which are analogous to those traditionally imposed by
state tort law. 82
5. Interpretations of the Constitutional Requirements of the Due Process Clause
by Different Authorities
Generally, “[s]tate courts are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights” 83 because
state courts’ jurisdiction is determined by state legislatures and not by Congress. 84 In addition,
Congress cannot lawfully force, either indirectly or directly, the Supreme Court to reverse a state
court’s decision as long as the state court’s jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution. 85
Traditionally, states may constitutionally exercise power over individuals, partnerships,
and unincorporated associations, which transact business or do certain acts within the states’
borders. 86 Likewise, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to recognize another state’s
judgment where the judgment is consistent with the Due Process Clause. 87 Thus, a judgment
delivered by a state court is enforceable in other states and enforceable in the United States.
79

See supra Part I.C.

80

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 324-25 (Black, J., dissenting)

81

PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 81; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT § 577A (1977).

82

See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).

83

H.M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953) (“The State courts, in the scheme of the Constitution, are the primary guarantors
of constitutional rights, and in many cases, they may be the ultimate ones. If they were to fail, and if Congress had
taken away the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and been upheld in doing so, then we really would be sunk.”
(international citation omitted)).
84

See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (stating that the federal government cannot interfere in
State courts’ decisions except in three cases by exclusive authority over the subject, by simple grant of authority, or
by a subsequent prohibition to the States).
85

See id. at 138.

86

See Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627 (1935) (stating that “A nonresident who gets all the
benefit of the protection of the laws of this State with regard to the office or agency and the business so transacted
ought to be amenable to the laws of the State as to transactions growing out of such business upon the same basis and
conditions as govern residents of this State. ‘It makes no hostile discrimination against nonresidents, but tends to put
them on the same footing as residents.’”).
87

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (describing that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not apply to French corporations).
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Nevertheless, the Court never interpreted these established provisions, but instead created new
models and left many questions unanswered.
Additionally, under the Commerce Clause, 88 states cannot limit corporations from carrying
out business in interstate commerce and cannot attach conditions so as to unduly burden interstate
commerce, but reasonable taxation and reasonable regulations are permissible. 89 However, some
have interpreted the Fifth Amendment as allowing the foreign defendant’s contact with the United
States as a whole rather than a particular forum. 90
An emerging view is that an existence of national contacts presumptively, but not
conclusively establishes jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment. 91 However, federal courts
provide a nationwide forum for a defendant through forum non-conveniens, 92 but state courts
provide a nationwide forum through the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 93 Additionally, some federal
statutes also allow both nationwide and worldwide service of process, thereby providing federal
and state courts the same territorial reach without regard to states’ boundaries. 94 Thus, the
minimum contacts model has absolutely no practical and theoretical purpose for determining
jurisdiction.
Even though we assume that the minimum contacts model is valid, it should be a
defendant’s burden to show that the chosen forum is sufficiently inconvenient and will be
materially disadvantageous in the trial of the case. 95 However, the challenge presented is the
distinction between the general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction under the minimum contacts
model. Professors Von Mehren and Trautman argued that
Jurisdictional rules customarily favored the defendant because, “at least when the
parties enjoy[ed] relatively equal economic strength and social standing,” the
burden was on the plaintiff to change the “status quo” between the parties. Indeed,
the traditional rule was that “actor forum rei sequitur (the plaintiff must pursue the
defendant in his forum).” Accordingly, traditional bases of jurisdiction--“in
personam,” “quasi in rem,” and “in rem”--predicated adjudicatory authority on the
sovereign’s physical power over the defendant or their property, expecting the

88

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”).
89

Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Oreson, 511 U.S. 91, 108 (1994) (citation omitted); see
Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
90

PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 119.

91

Id.

92

See 28 U.S.C. § 1397.

93

See infra text accompanying notes 153-164.

94

PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 118 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 22, which authorizes service on Clayton Act
defendant “wherever [defendant] may be found”; 15 U.S.C.A § 78aa (Section 27 of the 1934 Securities Act)).
95

PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 119.
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plaintiff to come to sue where one or the other could be found. 96
The recent cases made it clear that there is no “relatively equal economic strength and
social standing” 97 between individuals and orb-web corporations. 98 Arguably, due process remains
a complex theory because neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment clarified
how due process can be satisfied for either out-of-state corporations or orb-web corporations, but
the courts have evaluated case law with inconsistent dimensions and suggested several theories to
assert jurisdiction. 99 Therefore, a re-routed approach of jurisdictional law is of prime importance.
B. Consequences of a Plaintiff’s Forum Selection
Before examining an orb-web corporation more closely, it is important to know how
selection of a forum may influence or widen the jurisdictional gap. Assume that a selected forum
is a plaintiff’s domicile or the United States; the question is whether orb-web defendant
corporation would be burdened to litigate in the selected forum.
As Justice Holmes has described it, “domicil[e] is the technically pre-eminent headquarters
that every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights and duties that have been attached
to it by the law may be determined.” 100 Professor Lea Brilmayer has stated that “domicile of the
parties to a suit would provide a forum convenient to them. Defendants, especially, would seem to
benefit from a rule basing jurisdiction upon domicile.” 101 Although the theory of domicile does
not necessarily mean it would be convenient to the plaintiff alone, it certainly provides one sure
forum to sue a defendant. 102
Typically, plaintiffs have the option to file a suit in any forum related to that suit when the
plaintiff files with a court of the state where he or she is domiciled. However, a plaintiff’s choice
of forum requires substantial consideration of due process particularly when a foreign corporation
is involved. Perhaps “a plaintiff has [a] conceivable opportunity to shop around for a forum

96

Harvard Law Association, Personal Jurisdiction – General Jurisdiction – Daimler AG v. Bauman, 128
HARV. L. REV. 311, 316-17 (2014) (internal citation omitted) (stating that in general jurisdiction cases, the plaintiff
needs to come to the defendant’s place to sue while in specific jurisdiction cases, the defendant may come to him).
97

See cases cited supra notes 4-6.

98

Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The majority chides
respondents for conjuring a ‘parade of horribles,’ but says nothing about how suits like those described here will
survive its opinion in this case. The answer is simple: They will not.” (citation omitted)).
99

See, e.g., Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915 (describing defendants must be “essentially at home”); McIntyre, 564
U.S. 873 (describing that defendants contact must be purposeful); Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (same as Goodyear);
BNSF R. Co., 137 S. Ct. 1549 (describing that the defendant’s substantial and continuous contact is not enough).
100

Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914); see Christopher T. Corson, Reform of Domicile Law
for Application to Transients, Temporary Residents and Multi-Based Persons, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 327
(1981).
101

Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 730.

102

Id. at 730-31.
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because of geographical convenience and advantage of choice of law.” 103 It is also likely that a
plaintiff’s chosen forum may not be convenient for the defendant.
If an alternative forum is in a foreign country, involving a foreign corporation, a plaintiff’s
jurisdictional determination becomes even more complex. With respect to a foreign forum, it is
likely inconvenient to an individual plaintiff, but the same may not be true to a foreign-corporate
defendant. For example, in Goodyear, two boys from North Carolina died due to injuries sustained
in a tragic bus accident in France. 104 The case could have been litigated in France. 105 However, the
decedents were from North Carolina, so their parents returned to North Carolina for the burial and
filed a case in a North Carolina State court against Goodyear USA and its subsidiaries. 106
The trial court had to determine whether it would be reasonable to exercise jurisdiction
over the Goodyear defendants in state courts or federal district courts located in North Carolina.
The trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s forum selection would be appropriate although it is
inconvenient to the foreign subsidiaries. 107 Perhaps an answer lies in Restatement of Conflict of
Law § 29 that “[a] State has a power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is
domiciled in the State.” 108 However, the Supreme Court said that the state court could not assert
jurisdiction over the foreign defendants when they were not “essentially at home.” 109 Thus, the
Court’s language itself created a controversy.
On the other hand, the Goodyear plaintiffs might never have pursued their claims abroad,
particularly because the case was emotionally-charged and the plaintiffs claimed substantial

103

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981).

104

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918.

105

See id.

106

See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) (No. 10-76), 2010 WL
4628575, at *120-127 (Joint Appendix). At the time of the accident, the driver of the bus was acting as an agent of
Eric Meter, the French Soccer Network, the European Soccer Network, and NCYSA. The driver was a city bus driver,
and he generally did not drive buses to the airport, was not familiar with the highways, and had never driven a bus
along the route on which these events took place. When the bus reached the ramp on the intersection of highway, the
driver engaged in a loud and animated conversation with the travel agent and became distracted. On entering upon the
curve, the bus lost the control. The bus skidded sideways and hit a low, concrete separating wall then it over turned
onto its left side while returning onto the roadway and slid until it came to rest by the side off the roadway in a field.
The ramp on which the accident occurred was known to be a high accident area. Warning signs were posted in advance
of the curve. The posted speed limit was 70 km per hour, but the evidence presented showed that the driver was driving
100 km per hour. Additionally, heavy rain fell shortly before, and it was falling at the time the bus approached the
curve, substantially reducing the tires’ grip with the road. One of the children was sitting in the rear of the bus while
the other was sitting in a front seat of the bus. The bus’s tires were defective and failed while the bus was travelling
around the curve. The defective tires were manufactured by defendant Goodyear and its subsidiaries.
107

See Brown v. Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50, 55 (2009), aff’d, 364 N.C. 128 (2010), rev’d sub nom., Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
108

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 29 (1971); PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 28,
53; DICEY & MORIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 284-87 (13th ed. 2000).
109

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919
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damages. 110 The presumption of a chosen forum is “even stronger” when the plaintiff is an
American citizen and an alternative forum is a foreign country such as France. 111 Also, the Tenth
Amendment provides the “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.” 112
The question, then, is whether private and public interest factors render a plaintiff’s choice
of forum appropriate. In fact, “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” 113 In contrast, an important interest of the United
States in providing a forum in consideration of a foreign defendant was articulated in Iragorri v.
United Technologies Corp., 114 which reasoned that
It is not a correct understanding of the rule to accord deference only when the suit
is brought in the plaintiff’s home district. But the court must consider a plaintiff’s
likely motivations in the light of all relevant indications...motivated by legitimate
reasons, including the plaintiff’s convenience and the ability of the U.S. resident
plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction over the foreign defendant, and diminishing
deference to a plaintiff’s forum choice to the extent that it was motivated by tactical
advantage. 115
Similarly, if a non-citizen plaintiff files a case in the United States and if an alternative
forum is a better forum than the plaintiff’s selected forum, then a court gives stronger preference
to that alternative forum. 116 For example, in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal, the plaintiffs were non-U.S. citizens, and the defendant corporation, Union Carbide India
Limited (“UCIL”), was incorporated under Indian law but was a subsidiary of U.S. parentcorporation Union Carbide Corp., a New York corporation. 117
In this case, the tragic industrial disaster occurred in Bhopal, India, where a highly toxic
gas leaked from the plant in substantial quantities, killed more than 2100 people, injured over
200,000 people, killed livestock, damaged crops, and interrupted the city’s businesses. 118 Since
the parent corporation was born in the United States, the Indian Government filed cases involving
approximately 200,000 plaintiffs in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
110

See, e.g., D.W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non-Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353

111

Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale, 462 F.2d 376, 378 (2d Cir. 1972).

112

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

113

Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

114

Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001).

115

Id. at 73.

116

In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. 842, 844-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

117

Id.

118

Id.

(1994)
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New York. 119 The District Court held that India provided an adequate alternative forum for the
litigation by stating that when a plaintiff is foreign, the plaintiff’s choice of forum deserves less
deference. 120
Under established models, the Court recently said that the most fertile place to sue an orbweb corporation has been a neutral forum such as corporation’s world headquarters or principal
place of business. 121 If so, not only is the interest of judicial economy protected but also the
plaintiff’s case is much safer from being thrown out due to lack of personal jurisdiction.
Furthermore, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction whereas state courts are courts of
general jurisdiction. 122 The problem is that many U.S. plaintiffs do not have economic strength to
go to a different state, where the orb-web corporation’s headquarters is located, to sue a corporation
for its wrongdoing.
Under the minimum contacts model, states’ long-arm statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have established a ground to sue such defendants in state courts. 123 As Justice Scalia
once emphasized, “a plaintiff should simultaneously consider the ‘subject matter’ of the case, when
selecting a forum, because administrative simplicity is a major virtue in a jurisdictional statute...[a]
sort of vague boundary that is to be avoided in the area of subject-matter jurisdiction wherever
possible.’” 124 It is true that a federal forum may not be an appropriate forum for an individual
plaintiff when suing an orb-web-corporation.
For example, in Goodyear, the plaintiff filed a complaint and sent service of process under
a Hague Convention, a federal treaty, to three Goodyear subsidiaries, asserting a North Carolina
state court as a forum. 125 In Goodyear, the first problem arose when the alternative jurisdiction
was a foreign nation even though the plaintiffs asserted a state-law cause of action--a wrongful
death. 126 Second, Goodyear and its subsidiaries’ origination, direction, control, and co-ordination
were from the corporation’s world headquarters, located in Akron, Ohio. 127 Goodyear’s
subsidiaries could have had a fair opportunity to be sued in Akron, which also meant that the
plaintiff’s choice of forum would not have been very fruitful. 128 Third, plaintiffs have included
Goodyear’s North Carolina subsidiary, a plant incorporated in North Carolina, which has a
119

Id.

120

Id.

121

See infra note 128 and accompanying text

122

See Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 25-26 (1820) (recognizing a state court’s jurisdiction).

123

Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 375 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).

124

See id.

125

See Joint Appendix, supra note 106, at 3-119.

126

See id.

127

See id.

128

See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 130 (2010) (“[T]he phrase ‘principal place of business’ refers to
the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.”).
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principal place of business in New York. 129 In the light of these facts, the question arises whether
the plaintiff could have intended Goodyear North Carolina as an agent of Goodyear USA. The
plaintiffs could not sue in federal court, and the Court said that the plaintiff could not sue in the
state court, which ultimately resulted in a wrong forum.
Under the established law, state courts are very inconsistent in analyzing personal
jurisdiction. 130 Some courts consider factors, such as whether a plaintiff’s forum choice is
motivated by (a) the convenience of the plaintiff's residence in relation to the chosen forum, (b)
the availability of witnesses or evidence to the forum district, (c) the defendant’s amenability to
suit in the forum district, (d) the availability of appropriate legal assistance, and (e) other reasons
relating to convenience or expense. 131 Other courts consider whether a plaintiff’s forum selection
causes any harassment to the defendant, such as a tactical advantage resulting from local laws
favoring the plaintiff's case, juries’ habitual generosity in the forum district, the plaintiff’s
popularity or the defendant’s unpopularity in the region, or the defendant’s inconvenience and
expenses resulting from litigation in that forum. 132
In World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 133 the Court emphasized that a plaintiff may select
a forum, in tort litigation where the harm takes place, even though it may be unreasonably
burdensome to a non-resident defendant. 134 In this case, the plaintiffs, the Robinsons, were
domiciled in New York. 135 Defendants Seaway and Worldwide were also citizens of New York. 136
The plaintiffs purchased from the defendants an Audi which exploded and severely injured the
plaintiff’s wife and their child while they were moving to their new domicile, Arizona. 137 The
plaintiffs filed a case where the accident had occurred, a blue collar area outside Tulsa,
Oklahoma. 138 Even though the burden on the defendants had been always a primary concern, the
Court considered other factors, including
The forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest was not
adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum; the interstate
129

See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918.

130

See supra note 46 and accompanying text

131

Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus. Inc. 416 F.3d 146, 153 (2nd Cir. 2005) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 443, 507 (1947), cert denied sub nom., Tyumen Oil Comp. v. Norex Petroleum Ltd., 547 U.S. 1175
(2006)).
132

See, e.g., Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 72.

133

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.

134

Id. at 292.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id.
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judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,
and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies (internal citation omitted). 139
Often, a plaintiff’s careful selection of a forum results in winning or losing a case if the
selected forum satisfies the Due Process Clause. Like the plaintiffs’ forum selection in WorldWide Volkswagen, in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 140 the plaintiff’s forum selection was appropriate,
but the plaintiff was not given an opportunity in the United States, even though the plaintiffs
satisfied many of the “other factors” offered in World-Wide Volkswagen. 141
In Bauman, Argentinian employees’ estates (“plaintiffs”) filed a suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California alleging that MB Argentina collaborated with
Argentinian State security forces and kidnapped, detained, tortured, and killed its employees and
their relatives under the military dictatorship during Argentina’s “dirty war.” 142 Plaintiffs sued in
the United States under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, and under the laws of California and Argentina. 143 They claimed that Daimler
Mercedes Benz’s subsidiary, Mercedes Benz Argentina (“MBA”), unlawfully violated civil rights
in collaboration with Argentinian authorities. 144
Under these facts, it is unreasonable to expect these plaintiffs would have received a fair
hearing or an opportunity to be heard in their country. MBA was a subsidiary wholly owned by
Daimler’s predecessor in interest. 145 Plaintiffs filed a case in federal court in California because
Daimler had a subsidiary in California, MBUSA, which served as Daimler’s exclusive importer
and distributor in the United States. 146 MBUSA purchases Mercedes-Benz automobiles from
139

See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; See Tapio Puurunen, The Judicial Jurisdiction of States
Over International Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce from the Perspective of Legal Certainty, U.C. DAVIS
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 133, 199 (2002) (describing protecting consumer and State interests under the minimum contacts
and reasonableness test).
140

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).

141

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. Stating that other factors include the

[b]urden on defendant, [which] while always primary concern in determining jurisdiction of a
nonresident defendant, will in appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors,
including interest of forum state in adjudicating disputes, plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief, at least when such interest is not adequately protected by plaintiff's power to
choose the forum, interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining most efficient resolution of
controversies, and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental, substantive
social policies. (internal citation omitted).
142

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 751-52.

143

See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States.”).
144

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 752.

145

Id.

146

See id. at 751
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Daimler in Germany, then imports these vehicles, and ultimately distributes them to independent
dealerships located throughout the U.S. 147Although MBUSA’s principal place of business is in
New Jersey and incorporated in Delaware, it has multiple California-based facilities, including a
regional office in Costa Mesa, a vehicle preparation center in Carson, and a classic center in
Irvine. 148 MBUSA is the largest supplier of luxury vehicles in the California market, including
over 10% of all sales of new vehicles, which accounts for 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales. 149
Under these facts, it is hard to accept that the plaintiffs’ forum selection was not correct.
Additionally, the Court also noted that at the time of the lawsuit, Daimler-Chrysler North
America was holding a corporation, which wholly owned MBUSA. 150 After a lawsuit was filed,
MBUSA signed an agreement with Daimler AG under which MBUSA was recognized as an
“independent contractor” of Daimler, and that MBUSA was not a general or special agent, or
partner, or joint venture, or an employee of Daimler. 151
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could not assert jurisdiction in
California. 152 The Court relied on the contractual terms and did not recognize the constitutional
provisions that granted jurisdiction to federal district courts. 153 Although the federal statue granted
jurisdiction based on claims “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States,” 154 Daimler was a German company, and the agreement
between Daimler and MBUSA prevented the Court from asserting jurisdiction. 155
As noted, the parties entered contract after the case was filed even though it is generally
not accepted practice under the law. It is well established that the doors of Justice are open to
everyone regardless of race, religion, or nationality. If so, why was the plaintiffs’ forum selection
in Bauman incorrect?
In deciding cases like Daimler and many other orb-web corporations, the Court presented
no resolution to the disputes against those injured individuals. In short, the plaintiffs in Bauman
ended-up, once again, in a wrong forum.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See id.
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Perhaps the strongest string in this analysis are the recent cases such as Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 156 and Tyrrell. 157A typical case of forum selection by the plaintiff is Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. 158 There, a group of plaintiffs filed a case in California state court against the corporate
defendant Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”), a pharmaceutical company. 159 The Court noted that
only 86 plaintiffs were California residents and another 592 plaintiffs were not California
residents. 160 These plaintiffs filed a case asserting various state law based claims for health
injuries caused by the defendant’s pharmaceutical drug. 161 Although BMS was incorporated in
Delaware and had a principal place of business in New York, it maintained substantial operations
in New York, New Jersey, and California. 162 In California, BMS has five research and laboratory
facilities and employs around 164 employees and 250 sales representatives. 163 The Court
nevertheless advised that out-of-state plaintiffs may join with in-state plaintiffs “in a consolidated
action in the states that have general jurisdiction over” the corporate defendant. 164 However, the
Court also said that “the plaintiffs who are residents of a particular State—for example, the 92
plaintiffs from Texas and the 71 from Ohio—could probably sue together in their home States.”165
What the Court perceives from BMS is that although plaintiffs are free to make their forum
selection in theory, in practice, plaintiffs’ forum selection is limited because to win over forum
selection--the corporate defendant must be “essentially at home.” 166
156

Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1549; see also BMS.COM, https://www.bms.com/ aboutus/our-company/worldwide-facilities.html (last visited August 2017).
157

See id. (“We are a global biopharmaceutical company focused on helping to address the unmet medical
needs of patients with serious diseases. In 2016, we invested $4.9 billion in R&D, which included the discovery and
development of new medicines”).
158

Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1773.

159

Id. at 1778, 1779.

160

Id. at 1777.

161

Id. at 1783.

162

Id. at 1777-78.

163

Id. at 1773, 1778; Plavix Prod. & Mktg. Cases, No. JCCP4748, 2013 WL 6150251, at *2 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Sept. 23, 2013). One of BMS’s offices, in Milpitas California, is owned by BMS, and the remainder are leased.
The Milpitas facility is used primarily for research and employs 85 people. Three other offices are primarily used as
research and laboratory facilities.
164

Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1777-78.

165

Id. at 1783.

166

See id. at 1781.

The State Supreme Court found that specific jurisdiction was present without identifying any
adequate link between the State and the nonresidents’ claims. As noted, the nonresidents were not
prescribed Plavix in California,
did
not
purchase Plavix in California,
did
not
ingest Plavix in California, and were not injured by Plavix in California. The mere fact
that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly
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Likewise, in Tyrrell, the BNSF, a railroad defendant, had over 2,000 miles of railroad
track and employed more than 2,000 workers in the forum state. 167 In that case, the Court, relying
on precedent cases, said that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not permit a
state to hale an out-of-state corporation before its courts when the corporation is not “at home” in
the state and the episode-in-suit occurred elsewhere. 168 In Tyrrell, plaintiff Robert Nelson, a North
Dakota resident, brought a Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) suit against BNSF in a
Montana state court to recover damages for knee injuries he allegedly sustained while working
for BNSF as a fuel-truck driver. 169Another plaintiff, Kelli Tyrrell, appointed in South Dakota as
the administrator of her husband Brent Tyrrell’s estate, similarly sued BNSF under FELA in the
same forum state court. 170 Plaintiff Tyrrell’s widow alleged that the deceased plaintiff developed
a fatal kidney cancer from his exposure to carcinogenic chemicals while working for BNSF.171
The Court focused on the fact that neither plaintiff alleged injuries arising from or related to work
sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific
jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.

167

See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017); see also BNSF, UNITED STATES SECURITY
EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT 1-51, http://www.bnsf.com/about-bnsf/financial-information/pdf/10k-llc-2016.pdf.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC (BNSF or the Company) is a holding company that conducts
no operating activities and owns no significant assets other than through its interests in its
subsidiaries. BNSF’s principal, wholly-owned subsidiary is BNSF Railway Company (BNSF
Railway), which operates one of the largest railroad networks in North America. BNSF Railway
operates approximately 32,500 route miles of track (excluding multiple main tracks, yard tracks and
sidings) in 28 states and also operates in three Canadian provinces. Through one operating
transportation services segment, BNSF Railway transports a wide range of products and
commodities including the transportation of Consumer Products, Industrial Products, Agricultural
Products, and Coal, derived from manufacturing, agricultural and natural resource industries, which
constituted 35 percent, 25 percent, 22 percent, and 18 percent, respectively, of total freight revenues
for the year ended December 31, 2016. These Consolidated Financial Statements include BNSF,
BNSF Railway and other majority-owned subsidiaries, all of which are separate legal entities. Id. at
1.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation was incorporated in the State of Delaware on December
16, 1994. On February 12, 2010, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a Delaware corporation (Berkshire),
acquired 100% of the outstanding shares of Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation common
stock that it did not already own. The acquisition was completed through the merger (Merger) of a
Berkshire wholly-owned merger subsidiary and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation with the
surviving entity renamed Burlington Northern Santa Fe, LLC. Berkshire’s cost of acquiring BNSF
was pushed-down to establish a new accounting basis for BNSF beginning as of February 13, 2010.
Earnings per share data is not presented because BNSF has only one holder of its membership
interests. Id.
168

BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1553.
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Id. at 1554 (citation omitted).
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Id.
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Id.
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performed in the forum state and deceased plaintiff Tyrrell never worked for BNSF in the forum
state. 172 Thus, it is clear that not only plaintiffs must be forum state residents, but also defendants
must be forum residents as well.
It is clear that the light shed on “forum selection” by the plaintiff in these cases can be
seen only if each case is examined based on its own facts. The Court’s “heightened standard” to
sue continued in these series of cases. This is to say that it is almost impossible for U.S. plaintiffs
to sue even in their own states or foreign states unless both plaintiffs and defendants are
“essentially at home.”
C. Introduction of Orb-Web-Corporations
With undertaking an exhaustive review of plaintiffs’ forum selection and its consequences
as traced from the recent cases, it seems proper to say that the legal contents and structure of orbweb corporations and its application thereof in a factual framework in jurisdictional analysis is
anything but clear in the future cases. The development of “no forum” for a U.S. plaintiff prompts
observation of crucial differences among small corporations, multinational corporations, and orbweb corporations.
Small corporations are those discussed in International Shoe. Multinational corporations
have been described by one scholar: “[i]f one borrows from the business literature a working
definition of a multinational enterprise [“MNE”] as ‘a cluster of corporations of diverse
nationalit[ies] joined together by ties of common ownership and responsive to a common
management strategy,’ one sees that the present legal framework has no comfortable, tidy
receptacle for such an institution.” 173 This scholar said, “[t]he law recognizes as ‘international
corporations’ only those entities which are constructed by international law, that is, by treaty.”174
Thus far, the only representatives of the category are a small number of intergovernmental joint
ventures, largely between nations of the European Economic Community (“EEC”). 175
Additionally, multinational corporations may not be in the form of a parent-subsidiary relationship.
Orb-web corporations, on the other hand, are much larger corporations than multinational
corporations. These corporations expand and organize their businesses by establishing subsidiary
corporations in the form of a spider web. 176 Generally, an orb-web corporation is born from a
parent (or an “orb”) corporation, and it expands vertically and horizontally into subsidiaries
(forming a “web”). 177 Each subsidiary then vertically incorporates in another state (and country or
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See id. at 1558.
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Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 739, 740 (1970).
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Id.
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Id.
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See infra diagram 1.
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See Andersson, Ulf, Subsidiary Network Embeddedness: Integration, Control and Influence in the
Multinational Corporation (Jan. 24, 1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis) (on file at
http://uu.diva.portal.org/smash/record) (stating that under the legal system, subsidiaries may under corporate
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continent), expands its business in different countries, and may further affiliate with other
corporations and spread over an entire continent. However, only subsidiary corporations of the
parent are part of web. Even though other affiliates merely support (or do business with) the
subsidiaries for their spare parts and necessary by-products, with the subsidiaries, they are
independent companies and carry their own identity. The relationship between these subsidiaries
and the affiliates are often contractual, and they are not in the web, even though these affiliates
rely on the web (or subsidiaries).
Moreover, some of the subsidiaries horizontally incorporate and connect with other
subsidiaries of the orb corporation. This article calls these horizontal subsidiaries headquarters,
which are incorporated in such a way that they tie the entire web with the parent (or orb)
corporation. Also, these horizontal headquarters are directly connected with the parent corporation
to expand the parent corporation’s business and mission. Often, the board of directors and higher
officials of an orb-web corporation are the same for the orb and the headquarters even though these
headquarters are in different countries or continents. 178
These vertical subsidiary corporations disseminate in such a way to (i) address local
markets; (ii) minimize liability and protect assets; (iii) reduce cost of production by utilizing local
labor force, expertise, and resources; (iv) reduce transportation expenses; (v) match local market
demands and shape the production accordingly; (vi) conduct and maintain administrative work
effectively; (vii) create a monopoly by spreading the parent’s trademark and its product; (viii) sell
over productions for higher profits; (ix) maximize overall net profits of the parent corporation; and
(x) avoid paying taxes. 179 Thus, the strong interconnections between subsidiaries, headquarters,
and the orb form a giant web. The entire web plays an important role in carrying a mission of the
orb. In the web, each subsidiary makes its own contribution to the orb. In recent decisions, 180 the
Court overlooked that each subsidiary corporation of the orb was not a separate and distinct entity
but an integral part of the whole orb-web corporation. 181
embeddedness maintain relationship with sister subsidiaries, which affects the multinational corporation’s behavior
in general).
178

See infra diagram 1.
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See, e.g., Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in
Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589 (1975); Shyam Soni, Essay on the Meaning and Definition of Multinational
Corporation, PRESERVEARTICLES.COM, http://www.preservearticles.com/2012010319696/ essay-on-the-meaningand-definitio-of-multinational-company.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2017); Parent Companies and Their Subsidiaries
in the European Union, EUROPEAN COMMISSION TAXATION AND CUSTOMS UNION,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/parents-subsidiary_directive/index_en.htm (showing the
general behavior of the parent and subsidiary relationship); Tim Dickinson, The Biggest Tax Scam Ever, ROLLING
STONE (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-biggest-tax-scam-ever-20140827 (stating
that “Some of the America’s top corporations are parking profits overseas and ducking hundreds of billions in taxes.
And how’s Congress responding? It’s rewarding them for ripping us off”).
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See cases cited supra notes 4-6.

Kevin B. Barefoot, U.S. Multinational Companies: Operations of U.S. Parents and Their Foreign
BUREAU
OF
ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
(Nov.
2012),
Affiliates
in
2010,
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2012/11%20November/ 1112MNCs.pdf (stating that a U.S. MNC comprises a U.S.
parent company and its foreign affiliates, presented by the “Annual Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad
conducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)”).
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D. Problems with the Established Models in an Orb-Web Corporation’s Setting
As the diagram above indicates, orb-web corporations are structurally different from the
structure of the corporation involved in International Shoe. Hence, an application of the
established models in jurisdictional analysis of an orb-web corporation presents a grave legitimacy
and constitutionality problem. 182 Obviously, this unequal bargaining power between individuals
and orb-web corporations often favors and benefits corporations only. 183 Despite courts’ noble
intention to provide the maximum deference to out-of-state defendants, current jurisdictional
models are one-sided and biased. To overcome grave unconstitutionality and injustice, this Article
proposes three rerouted approaches that are consistent with the Court’s objectives.
This article proposes that the Constitution, through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, allows
a judgment rendered in a state court to be enforced in sister state courts and thus permits nationwide
jurisdiction. 184 In drafting the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the framers of the Constitution were
motivated by a desire to unify the U.S. as one nation while preserving the autonomy and
independency of a dual system of government. 185 To that end, they sought to guarantee that
182

See supra Part.I.A.1-2.

183

U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.

184

See Brilmayer, supra note 22, at 732 (“The power rationale, therefore, results in unavoidable circularity:
a State has power and thus jurisdiction over an absent defendant domiciliary only if sister States will enforce the
judgment, which sister States will do only if the first State had jurisdiction.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (“State
preclusion rules should control the matters that originally litigated in that State”).
185

Milwaukee Cnty. v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
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judgments rendered by the courts of one state would not be ignored by the courts of other states. 186
In Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 187 the Court clearly said
Article 4, s 1, not only commands that “full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State” but
it adds “Congress may be general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” And Congress
has exercised this power, by Act of May 26, 1790, c. 11, 28 U.S.C. s 687, 28 USCA
s 687, which provides the manner of proof of judgments of one State in the courts
of another, and specifically directs that judgments “shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the State from which they are taken.” 188
In addition, the Constitution has granted additional power to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant only if legislatures have authorized the courts by: (1) statutory
authorization to states through states’ long-arm statutes; and (2) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 189
Long-arm statutes authorize states to exercise their jurisdiction to the full extent allowed under the
Due Process Clause. 190 State long-arm statutes fall within a notion of “law of the nation” because
the law of the nation does not prevent a state from exercising jurisdiction over its citizens whether
they are travelling or residing abroad or residing in the state. 191
It is clear from the framers’ intent that the constitutional provision convincingly shows that
the state courts can assert general jurisdiction over [an orb-web corporation] under the presence
model. 192 However, the minimum contacts model serves no appropriate function even though the
Court recognized it as a constitutional mandate. 193 Hence, the sketch of the objective provides that
whether a corporation is present, in one state or another, it does not make any significant difference
in asserting jurisdiction if the first court has personal jurisdiction. 194
186

Id. at 273.
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Id.
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BORN RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 81-83 (5th ed. 2011)
[hereinafter RUTLEDGE].
190

Id.
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U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”).
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See infra Parts II., III.
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Id.; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927-28 (“A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sort within a State,’”
International Shoe instructed, “‘is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits
unrelated to that activity.’” Our 1952 decision in Perkins remains “[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction
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See sources cited supra note 4-8, 76.
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Assume for a moment that all foreign subsidiaries were separate and distinct entities as the
Court viewed them in Goodyear, and the constitutional guarantee and the framers’ intent were
ignored completely. 195 The fundamental concern with personal jurisdiction models is that they
stem from the Court’s decisions in two pre-industrial era cases. 196 However, recently it became
the prerogative of practitioners to embrace business law, corporate law, international law,
comparative law, product liability law, conflict of law, and economic models when determining
substantial and systematic contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over such orb-web
corporations. 197 Thus, our established jurisprudential philosophies do not provide any platform for
the United States’ plaintiffs to sue such orb-web corporations.
The Court’s articulation of the minimum contacts model became more prominent and raised
concerns in recent cases that warrant a changed approach: (1) Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 198 (2) Daimler AG v. Bauman, 199(3) J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,200 (4)
BNSF R. CO. v. Tyrrell,201 and (5) Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. San
Francisco Cty. 202 In these cases, the Court completely overlooked the distinction between the
factual situations in Pennoyer and International Shoe and that in Goodyear, McIntyre, Bauman,
and Bristol-Myers Squibb. As noted, our specific and general jurisdiction tests, under the minimum
contacts model, are circular, and failed to accommodate jurisdictional sphere over orb-web
corporate defendants. 203 Since the Court ignored the distinction, these principal cases have
signaled a serious need for a re-routed approach in personal jurisdiction analysis. 204
Another concern with the established models is that they are misguiding to lower state
courts and directed often towards an unfortunate outcome. For example, in Goodyear, the North
Carolina Trial Court concluded general jurisdiction over Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries based on

195

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929 (stating that “[m]easured against Helicopteros and Perkins, North Carolina is
not a forum in which it would be permissible to subject petitioners to general jurisdiction”); See also infra Parts II.,
III.
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See supra Part I.A.1-2.; McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 887 (Bayer J., concurring) (stating that the “Supreme Court
of New Jersey adopted a broad understanding of the scope of personal jurisdiction based on its view that ‘[t]he
increasingly fast-paced globalization of the world economy has removed national borders as barriers to trade.’...there
have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our
precedents” (citation omitted)).
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affidavits and evidence presented. 205 This case presented two problems. First, the state courts
followed the state laws. 206 Second, the state courts followed established models of jurisdiction.207
For example, in Goodyear, the trial court used the term “quality of the defendant’s contacts, which
include systematic and repeated contacts with the state of North Carolina for the purpose of
commerce along with the defendants’ ownership by U.S. corporations doing substantial business
in North Carolina, weighs in favor of finding general jurisdiction over the defendants.” 208 The
appellate court concluded that a state court might assert personal jurisdiction without altering or
departing from the essential character or a function of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
(or Fifth) Amendment. 209 Despite the adequacy of the lower courts’ reasoning, the Court said that
the North Carolina State courts do not have jurisdiction based on the established models. It is
apparent that the lower courts followed an indirect approach to assert jurisdiction. 210
The Due Process Clause never mentioned the minimum contacts model. 211 To be sure, the
Court states that all assertions of a state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated per the standards set
forth in International Shoe and its progeny. 212 Nevertheless, this phrase is too ambiguous to sustain
the conclusion that the framers and Congress intended to measure due process through the
minimum contacts model. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as that of the prePennoyer cases contains no reference to the term “minimum contacts.” 213
In the years since International Shoe was decided, a survey of cases reflects that the states’
courts often follow their own precedents under long arm statutes, which doubtlessly receive little
or no attention, 214 during the United States Supreme Court’s appellate review. If a foreign
205

Brown v. Meter, No. 05 CVS 1922, 2008 WL 8187601, at *1-3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2008), aff’d,
Brown v. Meter, 199 N.C. App. 50, 55 (2009), aff’d, 364 N.C. 128 (2010), rev’d sub nom., Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
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Vill, 395 N.J. Super. 520 (App. Div. 2007)).
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corporation (or a foreign-born, orb-web corporation) incorporates a subsidiary in the United States
and if the foreign parent still owns the trademark, then the subsidiary cannot get a trademark in the
United States. 215 Likewise, the same is true for a U.S.-born orb-web corporation’s foreign
subsidiaries. 216 Therefore, it is clear that the parent and subsidiaries are explicitly connected with
each other.
Consequently, this Article examines the policies underlying due process to determine its
proper application in orb-web corporations. Since Pennoyer and International Shoe, many
personal jurisdiction cases filed in state courts resulted in wasting the state judiciary’s time and
resources, as they did not demonstrate comity or federalism at all. 217 Nevertheless, plaintiffs wish
to file a case against or-web corporations in state courts even though the Court already has
predetermined a no jurisdiction rule. 218 Because our existing jurisdictional laws did not precisely
define when the amount of controversy does not meet the threshold limit to assert federal diversity
jurisdiction, a plaintiff has no recourse except to file the case in state courts. 219
II. GENERAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE PRESENCE MODEL: U.S. BORN, ORB-WEB CORPORATIONS
A. Presence: A Citizenship Theory
Theoretically, citizenship of an individual is determined by where the person is domiciled
and intends to remain indefinitely. 220 On the other hand, determination of a corporation’s
court typically evaluates in determining whether the required level of contacts exists: (1) quantity of the contacts
between the defendant and the forum State, (2) quality and nature of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of the
cause of action to the contacts, (4) the interest in the forum State, and (5) convenience of the parties.”).
215

See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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217

Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 (1996) (“a new theory of State sovereign immunity, the
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McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The plurality seems to State strict rules that limit
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Web site? And does it matter if, instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns the products through
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28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a). § 1332 has an amount in controversy requirement of $75,000. In Goodyear, the
plaintiff only sued for $10,000. Thus, it is likely that the plaintiff did not meet the amount in controversy.
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See Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377, 383 (1904) (describing that a natural person
must be citizen of the United States); U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1; Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914)
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citizenship serves two purposes: (1) it shows a corporation’s affiliation with the state for choice of
law, and (2) it helps to determine forum selection for orb-web or multinational corporations. 221 “A
corporation created by a State, ...[is] capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as
a natural person.” 222
However, corporations are generally domiciled or “at home” in at least two places: (1) their
state of incorporation, and (2) their principal place of business. 223 Our courts, however, recognized
only two places where a corporation can be at home. 224 Recently, the Court added that “the exercise
of general jurisdiction is not limited to these forums; in an ‘exceptional case,’ a corporate
defendant's operations in another forum “‘may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render
the corporation at home in that State.’” 225
Additionally, courts failed to provide a proper analysis for a corporation’s state of
incorporation under the presence model. The law under which it is organized determines a capacity
of a corporation to sue or to be sued. 226 Accordingly, domiciles of orb-web corporations are distinct
and separate from domiciles of individuals or single-domestic corporations. 227
Focusing on the rationale of state of incorporation, it would certainly be fair to sue the
U.S.-born parent corporation (or an orb-web corporation) in the United States, the country whose
law is responsible for a birth of entire orb-web-construction: parent and its affiliated subsidiaries.
Additionally, when a corporation is present in the United States through incorporation, it can never
violate the Due Process Clause to defend a lawsuit in its home (or a lawsuit arising on a different
continent). Because the Fourteenth Amendment says, “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside.” 228 Thus, the law suggests that all U.S.-born orb-web corporations may
have multiple citizenships rather than just dual citizenships.
Some courts have repeatedly held that to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant,
a complaint must include allegations of both the state of incorporation and the principal place of
business. 229 A common law principle supports this thesis further: When a parent corporation is
221

See supra text accompanying notes 172-180.
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incorporated in a forum state, the state court can assert general in personam jurisdiction for a cause
of action occurring anywhere in the United States (or in the world). 230 However, the courts have
never addressed the question: which states of incorporations and which principal places of
businesses should be considered when determining the citizenship? 231 To that end, the Court treats
each state of incorporation as a separate corporation under established state business laws. 232 But
the orb, as a parent corporation, is responsible for the blooming of the entire web corporations.
As noted, the Court treats civil cases differently than environmental cases. In
environmental cases, the Court has established that “any person who operates a polluting facility
is directly liable for the costs of cleaning up the pollution...regardless of whether that person is the
facility’s owner [or] the owner’s parent corporation.” 233 It is clear that in environmental cases, our
courts do not mind whether the parent corporation is located in the United States or not because
Congress has enacted the statute to address the issue. 234
In civil cases, however, the Court follows “separate and distinct” principles. Like in
environmental cases, in tort cases, an orb-web-parent corporation certainly satisfies citizenship
language. In addition, courts have an authority to exercise jurisdiction if it possesses statutory
authorization derived from a federal statute, 15 U.S.C. § 22, or from a state statute of general
application. 235 Thus, a state’s long arm statute may furnish a mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction
in both federal as well as state courts. 236 Furthermore, Rule 4(k)(2) authorizes the exercise of
personal jurisdiction in both federal question and diversity jurisdiction cases to the limits of due
process. 237
Assume that the orb-web-parent corporation is distinct and separate from its subsidiaries,
which not only violates many ethical stand points under quid pro quo terms, but also certainly
and location of principal place of business).
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United States v. Swiss Am. Bank Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 1999) (“A court need not even consider
them unless it possesses statutory authorization to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over defendants of the type
that the plaintiff targets. This authorization may derive from a federal statute, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 22 (providing for
worldwide service of process on certain corporate antitrust defendants), or from a State statute of general
application…. A State long-arm statute furnishes a mechanism for obtaining personal jurisdiction in federal as well
as State court.”).
236

Cf. Omni Capitol Int’l v. Rudol Wolf & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 106 (1987) (stating that “[s]ection 22, however,
is silent as to service of process,” and it would appear that Congress knows how to authorize nationwide service of
process when it wants to provide for it. That Congress failed to do so here argues forcefully that such authorization
was not its intention.).
237

See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).

31

VOL. 7 (2018)

conflicts with most states’ long-arm statutes and federal rules on long arm statute granting
nationwide jurisdiction to sue an orb-web corporation born in the United States. 238
1. An Orb-Web Corporation’s Multiple States of Incorporation: Which State of
Incorporation Should Be Considered as “Essentially at Home”?
Generally, an orb-web corporation has more than one (a) principal place of business, (b)
State of incorporation, (c) headquarters, and (d) subsidiary. 239Among all these recent cases,
Goodyear presents a good example of [parent] corporations’ orb in the United States because the
“essentially at home” devil disembarked from Goodyear. In Goodyear, the issue raised was
whether foreign subsidiaries of the United States based parent corporation were amenable to suit
in state courts on claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in a forum state? 240 The
plaintiffs were administrators of two youth soccer players from North Carolina. Both players were
killed in France while travelling in a bus to the airport and on their way to North Carolina. 241 At
that time, one of the defective tires, separated from it plies; the bus pulled off the roadway, and
flipped over. 242 Both youths’ administrators filed an action in a North Carolina trial court against
the Meter North Carolina soccer team, French soccer team, Goodyear Lastikeri T.A.S, Goodyear
Luxembourg Tires SA, Goodyear Dunlop Tires France SA, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,
USA (Goodyear), and its affiliated branches. 243
The foreign defendants (subsidiaries) were Goodyear USA’s subsidiaries. 244 Goodyear
245
USA contended that the ties between the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company and Goodyear
France, Goodyear Luxembourg, and Goodyear Turkey, respectively were indirect. 246 The
238
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Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915.
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Id.
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See id.
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Brown, supra note 164, at 1-3 (indicating that the plaintiff properly served the defendants Goodyear
Turkey, Goodyear France and Goodyear Luxembourg); see The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, The Hague Convention Art. 1, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
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Meter, supra note 204, 199 N.C. App. at 55; see Global Presence, GOODYEAR CORPORATE,
http://www.goodyear.com/corporate/about/facilities.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2017) (stating that Goodyear
subsidiaries has a principle place of business in Akron, OH. Goodyear had plants in North Carolina, and regularly
engaged in commercial activity there. Goodyear claims that as a global corporate citizen, Goodyear takes its
responsibility seriously.).
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See Richard J. Kramer, GOODYEAR CORPORATE, http://www.goodyear.com/corporate/bios/kramer.html
(stating that Rich Kramer is Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company. He has been Chairman since October 1, 2010 and President and Chief Executive Officer since April 13,
2010. He has been a member of Goodyear’s Board of Directors since February 23, 2010.).
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defendants argued that the Goodyear Turkey Regional Plant manufactured the defective tire that
was exclusive to that region. 247 Nevertheless, the record showed that Goodyear owned 100% of
Goodyear operations stocks. 248 Goodyear’s global enterprise has deep and longstanding roots in
North Carolina, registered to do business in North Carolina since 1956, and maintained, owned,
and operated three large tire and tire mold manufacturing plants in North Carolina.249
Furthermore, the record revealed that once a request to supply products was made through the
Goodyear enterprise, and products were produced, whether the plant was located in Turkey or in
North Carolina, and delivered through a distribution process handled through three channels-original equipment, replacement, or export. 250
Goodyear subsidiaries were incorporated in many States in the United States and expanded
into six continents, but Goodyear and its subsidiaries’ origination, direction, control, and
coordination were from the corporation’s orb, located in Ohio. Hence, the Goodyear subsidiaries
could have a fair opportunity to be sued in Ohio. 251 Turning to the question of State of
incorporation, Goodyear North Carolina was incorporated in North Carolina, but had its principal
place of business in New York. 252 Like Goodyear USA, all Goodyear branches (subsidiaries) are
incorporated and have a principal place of business in at at-least two States (countries or
continents): (a) where they are incorporated; (b) where they have principal places of business; and

marketing offices that develop business plans, sales plans, and determine how the needs associated with those plans
would be met. Goodyear’s sales marketing office would decide how to obtain from a European affiliate. After making
this determination, the needed tires would be manufactured, shipped to the United States, and distributed to retailers
and similar entities using Goodyear’s existing distribution system. Moreover, Mr. Kramer made clear that the
defendants do not send tires into the United States for distribution, but Goodyear makes that determination in this
country. Furthermore, Kramer Stated that these tires are not sold in the United States regularly, but the modified
versions were imported in 2006 when a strike closed the American plant that ordinarily produced them. Goodyear
needed to import these tires into NC because Goodyear did “not have a source here. Kramer also said that the
manufacturers did not have their own distribution system for the sale of their tires, but instead used their Goodyear
parent and affiliated companies to distribute the tires they manufactured to the United States and to NC.
247

See Brown, supra note 106, at 1-2 (describing that defendant Goodyear [Turkey] is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Goodyear. However, the plaintiff’s pleading states that Goodyear [Turkey] is a Turkish corporation with
its principal place of business in Turkey).
248

See Brief for Respondents at 8, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)
(No. 10-76), 2010 WL 5125441, at *4.
249

Brief for Respondents at 5, supra note 204, at 2 (“Goodyear’s global enterprise has deep and longstanding roots in North Carolina. Goodyear has been registered to do business there since 1956 and maintains a
registered agent in Raleigh. It also owns and operates three large tire and tire-mold manufacturing plants in
Fayetteville, Statesville, and Asheboro, North Carolina” (citing Dep’t of the Secretary of State, N.C, available at
http://www.secretary.State.nc.us/corporations/Corp.aspx?PitemI d=5030445 [listing for “Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company”].).
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Brief for Respondents at 9, supra note 204, at 6 (stating that Mr. Kramer admitted that tires manufactured
at Goodyear Luxembourg’s plant had also been requested, brought into, and sold by Goodyear Luxembourg through
the Goodyear enterprise in NC for use on cement mixers, waste haulers, and front-end loaders).
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(c) their permanent identity, at their orb, in Ohio. 253 Even though the orb-web subsidiaries
generally operate away from home, the parent and subsidiaries are connected with each other
horizontally, vertically, and centrally with the orb-web parent corporation. Therefore, the
subsidiaries would not exist independently.
As the Court held, the corporation is present in its home or principle place of business
where the corporate activities are continuous and systematic. 254 Due Process requires that an outof-State defendant can be sued if the lawsuit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” 255 “Fair play and substantial justice” allows a U.S. plaintiff to sue a U.S.-based
orb-web parent, which deliberately controls its corporate form in order to secure its advantages; it
would be inequitable to shield the liabilities raised by naming its subsidiaries as non-residentcorporate defendants. 256
Another great example presented in a very recent case, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. BristolMyers Squibb is a fortune 500 pharmaceutical company incorporated in Delaware and
headquartered in New York. 257 The company employs 25,000 worldwide and generates 15
billion.258 The California Supreme Court noted that Bristol-Myers Squibb “d[id] not contest that
its marketing, promotion, and distribution of Plavix was nationwide and was associated with
California-based sales representatives.” 259 Additionally, BMS had a contract with McKesson
Corporation, co-defendant in this case. McKesson is headquartered in San Francisco. 260
The Court said that although BMS engaged in business activities in California and sold
Plavix there, “BMS did not develop, create a marketing strategy for, manufacture, label, package,

253

See SEC Charges Goodyear With FCPA Violations, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 24,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-38.html.
254

See, e.g., Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (describing that International Shoe involved State forum court);
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the
individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at
home.” (citing Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 728 (identifying domicile, place of incorporation, and principal place of
business as “paradig[m]” bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction))); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (stating that the
rationales of the Pennoyer and Harris decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled, but when
asserting jurisdiction over a corporation in a State court, the court must follow the test set forth in International Shoe).
255

See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795, 813-16 (1948) (stating that a foreign parent could
be “found” in the United States because of its “constant supervisions and intervention” in the activities of its U.S.
subsidiaries going well “beyond normal exercise of shareholder’s rights.”); Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 930 (stating that
the plaintiffs failed to identify the defendants’ “discrete status as subsidiaries and treatment of all Goodyear entities
as a ‘unitary business,’ so that jurisdiction over the parent would draw in the subsidiaries as well”).
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Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court noted
the facts that the company advertised and distributed nationwide).
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See id. at 1773, 1778, 1781.
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or work on the regulatory approval for Plavix in the State.” 261 Additionally, “the nonresident
plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained Plavix from a California source, that they were injured
by Plavix in California, or that they were treated for their injuries in California.” 262 This was a new
requirement added by the Court. The dissenting Justice said,
it is difficult to imagine where it might be possible to bring a nationwide mass
action against two or more defendants headquartered and incorporated in different
States. There will be no State where both defendants are “at home,” and so no State
in which the suit can proceed. What about a nationwide mass action brought against
a defendant not headquartered or incorporated in the United States? Such a
defendant is not “at home” in any State. 263
International Shoe only suggests that a subsidiary located in the United States can be sued
to assert jurisdiction over its parent corporation (and its other affiliated branches or units). 264 Thus,
the courts can fairly ask in return for general jurisdiction of the State courts (or federal courts in
appropriate circumstances, if proper diversity is established). 265 However, in recent cases, the
Court recognized that the subsidiaries are distinct corporate entities even though they are not
separate from the orb at all. 266 In one way or another, these subsidiaries or branches get many
benefits from the parent corporation--substantially, systematically, and continuously. 267
2. An Orb-Web Corporation’s Principal Places of Business: Which Principal
Place of Business Should Be Considered as a “Perkins Textbook Case”?
Like the State of incorporation, a principal place of business also presents a critical
challenge to lower courts and practitioners because the Court has never clarified which principal
place of business should be focused on to determine an orb-web corporation’s actual business
activities for jurisdictional purposes. For example, in Goodyear, the Court held that Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 268 remains the textbook case for general jurisdiction
appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum. 269
The Court said that unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was
261

See id.
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Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
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Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, n.9.
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Goodyear, 564 U.S at 928 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)).
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See id. (internal citation omitted).

35

VOL. 7 (2018)

conducted in Ohio, the Goodyear subsidiaries are in no sense at home in North Carolina. 270 The
Court in Goodyear said that Goodyear subsidiaries lacked the kind of continuous and systematic
general business contacts necessary to allow North Carolina to entertain a suit against them
unrelated to anything that connects them to the State. 271
In Perkins, the foreign defendant, Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., operated gold and
silver mines in the Philippines, and ceased its operation during World War II. 272 The mining
company’s president returned to his Ohio hometown and maintained an office, conducted business
for the corporation, kept corporate records, deposited company funds in an Ohio bank, designated
the Ohio bank as a transfer agent for the corporation’s stock, paid his own salary and the salaries
of two Ohio-based secretaries, and organized directors’ meetings at his home office in Ohio
without registering to do business in Ohio. 273 As general manager, he supervised policies dealing
with the rehabilitation of the corporation’s properties in the Philippines and dispatched funds to
cover purchases for corporate rehabilitation from his Ohio office. 274 He carried on a continuous
and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company by
discharging his duties as president and general manager. 275 Although the company did not have
any mining properties in Ohio, the company directed many of its wartime activities from Ohio at
the time he was served with summons.276
In Perkins, the Court said that the Ohio court had ultimate power to determine jurisdiction
over the foreign corporation because the foreign corporation’s president “ha[d] been carrying on a
continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business from Ohio,” and the exercise
of general jurisdiction over the Philippine corporation by an Ohio court was “reasonable and
just.” 277 The Court also concluded that the foreign corporation’s activities in Ohio made the Ohio
office as the corporation’s “principal place of business.” 278
However, the Court in Goodyear failed to see, among other things, that World War II
influenced the Perkins decision and subsequent cases would not be decided in the same
circumstances. First, the magnitude of corporate activities in Perkins was significantly trivial
compared to the magnitude of activities in Goodyear. 279 Second, Perkins only provided a black
270
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Id. at 448; See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
278

Id. at 447-48.

279

See supra text accompanying notes 271-77.

THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

36

line rule for one place of incorporation, only one place of business, the corporation’s principal
place of business. In addition, in Perkins, the defendant corporation did not have any other place
of business compared to today’s extremely complex global corporate web such as Goodyear and
its subsidiaries. Third, in Perkins, Ohio was the company’s tentative place of business while the
company was still recouping its activities in Philippines. On the other hand, many Goodyear
subsidiaries are incorporated and doing business in the United States and abroad, having world
headquarters in the United States and at least three other headquarters on three different
continents. 280
The factual situation in Perkins is akin to a small-rural-town vendor operating a store (X)
and keeping the store goods in his house or warehouse, both within the town (Y). For example, the
vendor expands his business by opening another store in town (X1), or a neighboring town (or a
neighboring State, country, or continent) and earns profits, makes purchases, pays rents and
salaries, but operates and oversees it through one of his relatives, family members or a third person,
and pockets the profits? Can the store in town X1 (or the State, or the country, or the continent) be
“at home” in town X (or the State or the country or the continent)? As you see from this simple
hypothetical, it is not possible. But both stores share the same owner. However, this information
can only be proved by extensive discovery.
What if the same vendor starts the same type of store, with his name, in another State (X1)?
Can X1 be “at home” in the first State? Under the principle stated in Goodyear, store X1 may
satisfy the minimum contacts model, but more likely, it cannot satisfy the “at home” test because
store X1 is not in the forum State (X). In Perkins, the defendant could satisfy the “at home” test
because he operated in the same town as illustrated in the hypothetical and did not have the parentsubsidiaries bond that orb-web corporations share.
As in Perkins, if a corporation’s headquarters and executive offices are in the same State
in which it does most of its business, it would be the corporation’s principal place of business. 281
Many companies’ corporate headquarters, including executive offices, are in one State or country,
while the corporation’s plants or other centers of business activity are located in other States or
countries. 282 The factual situations presented in Goodyear and Perkins show that the “at home”
test should not be raised in case of orb-web corporations, which are webbed out in multiple
principal places of business and multiple States of incorporation. So far, the courts have addressed
a corporation’s principal place of business or State of incorporation for jurisdictional purpose.283
However, the Court has never addressed which headquarters is the principal place of business
because there is no precedent established on this point until today.
One court concluded that a corporation’s principal office rather than a factory, mill, or
mine...constitutes the principal place of business. 284 Another court found that “principal place of
280
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See, e.g., Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309, 314–315 (4th Cir. 2001); Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia
Nat’l. Corp., 101 F.3d 900, 906–907 (2d Cir. 1996).
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business” refers to the place where a corporation’s officers actually direct, control, and coordinate
the corporation’s activities, the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters and which
is not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings. 285
As a textual matter, the Court did not address which principal place of business should be
considered when there are many. In addition, how do the “at home” and the substantial, systematic,
and continuous contacts tests merge? The “at home” analysis requires courts to follow the
minimum contacts model while the substantial, systematic, and continues contacts test requires
courts to follow the presence model. Looking closely at both models, the minimum contacts model
is used as an alternative approach to determine jurisdiction, but the presence model provides a
direct approach to assert jurisdiction. In short, these vivid approaches adapted by the courts
illustrate that courts are neither settled on an approach nor suggest any likelihood of settling in the
future if they continue to follow the established precedents.
3. “Substantial, Systematic, and Continuous Contacts”: Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall
Recently, in Goodyear, the Court also followed Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall as a twin case of Perkins. 286 In Helicopteros, a wrongful death claim was initiated, in the
Texas State court against a Columbian corporation having its principal place of business in
Columbia. 287 This issue commenced from a helicopter crash in Columbia. 288 The defendant made
trips to Texas, purchased approximately four million dollars or 80% of the defendant’s fleet and
related items, and paid approximately five million dollars, within seven years of its business
relationship with Helicol. 289 The State court concluded that Helicol’s purchase of over four million
dollars’ worth of equipment and regular training of pilots constituted sufficient contacts. 290 But
the Court held that the contacts were not substantial, systematic, and continuous general business
contacts like the defendant’s contacts in Perkins; therefore, the forum court could not assert
jurisdiction. 291 Nowhere in the opinion, however, did the Court address what “substantial,
systematic, and continuous” meant, but said that a four million dollars’ worth of business was not
substantial. 292
Some courts have developed a relative approach to determine what is substantial,
285
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Cir. 1986); Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Weinfeld, J.,
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systematic, and continuous contacts under Helicopteros, which gave birth to the relative approach
theory. 293 Both International Shoe and Helicopteros were decided under the minimum contacts
model; therefore, this relative approach is irrelevant in establishing the “at home” test. 294 Because
one of impediments to using the minimum contacts model is the distinction between the general
and specific jurisdiction, the model must be abandoned. 295While Helicopteros and Perkins may
arguably have presented an interesting illustration of the substantial, systematic, and continues
contacts test, both cases were distinct and limited to specific context. 296 Hence, these cases do not
support State courts’ jurisdiction under the citizenship theory. 297
4. Relative Approach Theories
There are, at least, three approaches developed under the relative approach theories. 298 The
first theory is the place of operation theory, in which a corporation’s physical presence in different
States such as corporation’s multiple centers of manufacturing, purchasing, or sales can be
presumed as a principal place of business. 299 Obviously, it undermines its applicability in an orbweb corporation because a corporation might divide its production facilities and principal places
of businesses into segments. 300
For example, in Goodyear, Goodyear USA owned 52 production facilities, in 22 countries,
with approximately 62,000 employees, which operated in four segments, covering a worldwide
operation. 301 In addition, each segment had a headquarter and State of incorporation. 302 Each
Goodyear subsidiary has at least two States of incorporation (one in Ohio and one in another
country or continent) and at least two principal places of businesses. Goodyear USA also maintains
executive and administrative functions in those respective States or nations. But in Ohio, it has a
293
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See supra discussion Part II.A.1-2.; see infra discussion Part II.A.5.

295

Id.

296

Id.

297

See Peace v. Peck, 18 How. 595, 599 (1856).

298
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production activities, purchasing, sales); Topp v. Comp. Air, Inc., 814 F.2d 830, 834 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987) (factories,
warehouses, sales offices); Grimm v. Plasma Processing Corp., 888 F. Supp. 56, 58 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (“corporate
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principal place of business as well its birth place, i.e., principal State of incorporation. 303 Thus,
Goodyear USA, as an entire orb-web corporation, has multiple principal places of businesses and
multiple State-of-incorporations, a scenario not supported by our existing precedents.
The second theory is the “nerve center test” established in Hertz Corp. v. Friend. 304 In
Hertz, the Court standardized the “nerve-center test” to determine a corporation’s principal place
of business, but did not answer when a corporation has many principal places of businesses and
when a plaintiff can assert jurisdiction in the State courts. 305 Thus, the nerve-center test is not
supportive because Hertz involved the federal forum. In addition, if a corporation is winged out in
an orb-web form, it is difficult for a U.S. plaintiff to bring a case in federal forum under diversity
jurisdiction for a U.S.-based orb-web corporation.
The third theory is the far-flung theory as developed by a prominent Judge Edward
Weinfeld who articulated that
where a corporation is engaged in far-flung and varied activities, which are carried
on in different States, its principal place of business is the nerve center from which
it radiates out to its constituent parts and from which its officers direct, control, and
coordinate all activities without regard to locale, in the furtherance of the corporate

303

See
Corporate
Responsibility,
GOODYEAR
CORPORATE,
http://www.goodyear.com/responsibility/introduction-company-profile.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2017).
Looking back, the founding of The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company in 1898 seems especially
remarkable, for the beginning was anything but auspicious. The 38-year-old founder, Frank A.
Seiberling, purchased the company’s first plant with a $3,500 down payment--using money he
borrowed from a brother-in-law Lucius C. Miles. The rubber and cotton that were the lifeblood of
the industry had to be transported from halfway around the world, to a landlocked town that had
only limited rail transportation. Even the man the company’s name memorialized, Charles
Goodyear, had died penniless 30 years earlier despite his discovery of vulcanization after a long and
courageous search…. Even the depression of 1893 was beginning to fade. So on August 29, 1898,
Goodyear was incorporated with a capital stock of $100,000…. But it was the dynamic and visionary
founder, hard-driving Seiberling, who chose the name and determined the distinctive trademark. Id.
See also Managing Risk, GOODYEAR CORPORATE http://www.goodyear.com/responsibility/peoplemanaging-risk.html?1#eliminating-risk (last visited Aug. 30, 2017). (describing that Goodyear is one of the world's
leading tire companies, with operations in most regions of the world. Together with its U.S. and international
subsidiaries and joint ventures, Goodyear develops, manufactures, markets and distributes tires for most applications.
It also manufactures and markets rubber-related chemicals for various applications. Goodyear is one of the world’s
largest operators of commercial truck service and tire retreading centers. In addition, it operates approximately 1,400
tire and auto service center outlets where it offers its products for retail sale and provides automotive repair and other
services. Goodyear manufactures its products in 52 facilities in 22 countries. It has marketing operations in almost
every country around the world).
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305
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See id. (“It is the place that Courts of Appeals have called the corporation’s ‘nerve center.’ And in practice
it should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters—provided that the headquarters is
the actual center of direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’ and not simply an office where the
corporation holds its board meetings (for example, attended by directors and officers who have traveled there for the
occasion”).

THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

40

objective. 306
This theory may be relevant in an orb-web corporation’s settings, but the court limited its analysis
to United States based corporations.
5. The Incorrect Mixture Rule: A Merger of the Presence and Minimum Contacts
Models
Courts and litigators should seize an opportunity to clear the jurisprudential cloud in this
area because neither State nor federal courts have made it clear in which situations they can
exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-State corporation based on the presence of subsidiary
corporations within the United States. 307 Under the current approach, presence and State of
incorporation are determined upon the minimum contacts with a State, but this approach looked
only at the magnitude of activities (the relative approach theory). 308
As noted, this test may be relevant for an orb-web corporation, but it is limited to one
principal place of business. For example, in High Ridge Park Assoc. v. NYCOM Information Serv.
Inc., 309 NYCOM, the defendant, was an operator and provider of a long-distance telephone service
having 240 employees, all of whom were in Florida. 310 The senior officers and directors of the
company, however, were in Connecticut. 311 The High Ridge Court held that Connecticut was the
principal place of business because the Stamford Connecticut office was responsible for running
the daily operations of NYCOM, as well as formulating the overall business strategy. 312 The
Stamford office was responsible for press releases, management decisions, hiring personnel, legal
and regulatory work, answering shareholder and investor inquiries and requests, and overseeing
[the subsidiaries’] operations. 313 In High Ridge, there were only 240 employees, so it is easy to
keep them all in one town (or city); but the same is not true in the case of Goodyear or other U.S.
based orb-web corporations.
Earlier, in Perkins, the “substantial business contacts” involved only three-employees and
306
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corporate activities at the corporation’s one and only place of business. 314 However, in
Helicopteros, four million dollars’ worth of business transactions were not substantial. 315
Likewise, in Goodyear, sending approximately 45,000 tires over three years to a sister subsidiary
in North Carolina was not substantial. 316 In International Shoe, the Court upheld significant
presence over a non-consenting corporation when only eleven of its employees were engaged in
corporate activities. 317 In Consolidated Textile Corp., the Court specifically held that in-State sales
of an absent corporation’s products did not establish the necessary “presence”--even when the
wholly owned subsidiaries made sales in the forum. 318 Indeed, the facts in Goodyear were even
more compelling, even though, in Consolidated Textile Corp., the defendant directly caused the
sales in the forum as such in Goodyear’s subsidiaries, but in Goodyear, the Court approached this
argument from the other direction.
The relative approach theory causes the lower State courts to fall into the trap of analyzing
both specific and general jurisdiction. 319 For example, in Goodyear, the Court said
Confusing or blending general and specific jurisdictional inquiries, the North
Carolina courts answered yes. Some of the tires made abroad by Goodyear’s foreign
subsidiaries, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stressed, had reached North
Carolina through “the stream of commerce”; that connection, the Court of Appeals
believed, gave North Carolina courts the handle needed for the exercise of general
jurisdiction over the foreign corporations. 320
The North Carolina trial court did not confuse itself with the mixture rule under the
presence and minimum contacts models as the Court claimed. As a matter of fact, first, the North
Carolina State court examined the statutory authorization to sue the so-called “foreign defendants”
under the “state’s long arm statute” that the Court has set as a requirement to determine whether
the defendants had minimum contacts with North Carolina. 321 Under the minimum contacts model,
the North Carolina Court was bound to determine whether the case fell within the specific or
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See supra text and accompanying notes 271-277.

315

Helicopteros, 446 U.S. at 411-12.

316

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 921; Brown, supra note 106, at 1-3.
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See supra text accompanying notes 55-64.
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See Consol. Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 88 (1933).
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See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 921.
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Meter, supra note 204, at 57 (stating that due process considerations established in Int’l Shoe prohibits
our States courts from exercising general jurisdiction unless the defendant has had certain minimum contacts with the
forum State).
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general jurisdiction depending upon the number of contacts. 322 Thus, establishing jurisdiction
under the minimum contacts model is not only challenging, but requires proper determination of
general or specific jurisdiction, which hinges on the application of the minimum contacts model.
For example, In Tyrrell, the Court said that BNSF was not incorporated in Montana and
did not maintain its principal place of business there. 323 Nor was BNSF so heavily engaged in
activity in Montana “as to render [it] essentially at home” in that State. 324 However, the Court
noted that BNSF had over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000 employees in
Montana,” but shifted the focus, stating that “the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus solely
on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.” 325 Furthermore, the Court said that “the
inquiry ‘calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety’; ‘[a] corporation that
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”’ 326 The Court reasoned
that the business BNSF does in Montana is sufficient to subject the railroad to specific personal
jurisdiction in that State on claims related to the business it does in Montana. 327 However, the
Court confused the holdings in Daimler and Goodyear, because these precedents did not allow
“the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims like Nelson’s and Tyrrell’s that are unrelated to
any activity occurring in Montana.” 328 On the other hand, Justice Sotomayer opined that
the majority’s approach grants a jurisdictional windfall to large multistate or
multinational corporations that operate across many jurisdictions. Under its
reasoning, it is virtually inconceivable that such corporations will ever be subject
to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business
or of incorporation. Foreign businesses with principal places of business outside
the United States may never be subject to general jurisdiction in this country even
though they have continuous and systematic contacts within the United States.329
This article suggests that an orb-web corporation’s world headquarters satisfies both the
State of incorporation and principal place of business to adjudicate any case that arises out of such
contacts with a U.S.-based parent corporation because “minimum contacts” automatically satisfies
in such case. In addition, these orb-web corporations can also be sued in any States in which it has

322

Id. at 58 (stating that the dispute is not related to, nor arises from Defendant’s contacts with North
Carolina, so it is a specific jurisdiction case).
323

Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. at 1559 (majority opinion)
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.

328

Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Id., at 1560 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting).
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subsidiaries or business offices in the United States under Rule 4(k)(1)(A). 330 Although there is no
simple formula to provide an answer to the principal place of business inquiry, the Court’s
established rules cannot be aligned consistently across the board in all cases. 331 Thus, re-routing is
needed with the existing laws. 332
B. Presence: A Parent-Subsidiary Relationship Theory
Under the traditional theory, an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property
suggests presence because Pennoyer rested on the premise that a proceeding “against” property is
a proceeding against the owners of that property unless service of process is not proper. 333 In orbweb corporation cases, a question arises whether jurisdiction can be asserted over a parent
corporation or subsidiary if the parent or subsidiary does business or is registered to do business
in the forum State.
Under the agency theory, a parent corporation is constructively present through the
subsidiary to such degree that it would be fundamentally fair to hail the corporate defendants in
any litigation arising out of any transaction or occurrence anywhere in the world. 334 In general, all
corporations must necessarily act through agents, but a wholly owned subsidiary may be an
agent. 335 A principal is responsible for the actions of its agent if the principal and the agent manifest
assent. 336
Likewise, a subsidiary doing business of a parent may constitute presence. A corporation
is “present in a forum State if it does business in the forum State ‘not occasionally or casually, but
with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.’” 337 If an agent (or a subsidiary) is doing
business of a parent, then the parent is subject to in personam jurisdiction of the state in which the
activities occurred. 338 Solicitation of a business alone, on the other hand, is insufficient to find a
330

See FED. R. CIV. P. 4, 26

331

Bauman, 134 S. Ct at 773 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that the current “approach would
preclude the plaintiffs...from seeking recourse anywhere in the United States even if no other judicial system was
available to provide relief.”).
332

See supra text and accompanying note 262.

333

Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (invalidating notions of jurisdiction based on a State’s “power” over property of
a defendant located in the State).
334

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (stating that “a master is subject to liability for the
torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.”).
335

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013) (“the most basic features of an agency relationship
are missing here. Agency requires more than mere authorization to assert a particular interest. An essential element of
agency is the principal’s right to control the agent’s actions” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01,
Comment f (2005)).
336

United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 506 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted).

337

Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Tauza v. Susquehanna
Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267 (1917)).
338

Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Cassel, 302 F.2d 132, 137 (10th Cir. 1962); D'Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566
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corporate presence in a forum state, but other factors must be present to support jurisdiction. 339 A
parent corporation’s branch offices (or subsidiaries) in a forum state suggest “doing business” and
that establishes the corporation’s presence. The presumption of corporate separateness must be
overcome, by clear evidence, that the parent controls activities of its subsidiary. 340
Typically, a parent-subsidiary’s connection, either by doing business or by an agency
relationship, seems sufficient for a parent-subsidiary’s identity under the presence model. 341 By
itself, a mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is insufficient to establish a principalagent relationship between two entities, 342 but the plaintiff’s statement would suffice. 343 For
example, in Goodyear, the Court held that the plaintiff, either below or in the brief, must urge [an
orb web corporation] as a unitary entity so that jurisdiction over the parent would draw the
subsidiaries as well. 344
C. Presence: A Piercing Corporate Veil Theory
In the contemporary setting, a piercing corporate veil in an orb-web corporation is
controversial. For example, Goodyear stands for the proposition that a court may assert general
jurisdiction over foreign (sister-State or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims
against them when they are affiliated essentially at home in the forum State. 345 In Goodyear, the
Court said a connection between the forum and the foreign corporation must be “continuous and
systematic.” 346 In effect, the plaintiff would have to pierce the Goodyear corporate veil, at least
for jurisdictional purposes. 347 So described, the text of the opinion suggests that the corporate veil
is allowed for the fault of a foreign subsidiary as long as the foreign subsidiary maintains
continuous contacts. In this view, if relief sought by a U.S. plaintiff against a U.S. subsidiary (or
a foreign subsidiary) is directed against the U.S. parent orb web corporation, the courts should
F.3d 94, 108-09 (3d Cir. 2009).
339

Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Serv. Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1990).

340

Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1162 (5th Cir. 1983).

341

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1984); Gallelli
v. Crown Import LLC., 701 F. Supp 2d. 263 (E.D. N.Y. 2010).
342

See Flintridge Station Assoc. v. Am. Fletcher Mortgage Co., 761 F.2d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing
Matter of Chrome Plate, Inc., 614 F.2d 990, 996 (5th Cir. 1980)).
343

See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 930.
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See id.
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See id. at 921.
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Id.
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Id. at 930 (citing Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal
Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14, 29-30 (1986) (merging parent and
subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes requires an inquiry “comparable to the corporate law question of piercing the
corporate veil”).
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recognize such veil-piercing theory.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court Rule 29.6 (or similar State court rules)
mandates that [n]on-governmental corporate parties in “every document filed in the Supreme
Court proceeding must list the name of all ‘parent corporations’ and any publicly held company
that owns 10% or more of the corporate stock. 348 If there is no parent or publicly held company
owning 10% or more of a corporation’s stock, a notation to this effect shall be included in the
documents. 349 Under the Court’s enterprise liability doctrine, jurisdiction over a U.S. parent
corporation can be asserted by a U.S. plaintiff if he or she discloses the corporate disclosure
statement early in the litigation. 350 Surely, a plaintiff may pierce corporate veil as long as the
plaintiff does not intend to put an orb-web parent corporation out of its existence. 351
In the traditional setting, the courts dislike piercing corporate veil. 352 To that end, one
court established a two-step inquiry whereby “unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual [or a subsidiary] no longer exist[,]” and when
“adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote
injustice.” 353 For example, in DeWitt Truck Brokers Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., the court
noted that independent corporate status may be disregarded when factors such as gross
undercapitalization, fraud, failure to observe corporate formalities, non-functioning of officers and
directors, or similar circumstances indicate that the subsidiary is merely the shadow of the
parent. 354
Some courts follow a “horizontal veil piercing theory,” to sue a brother or a sister
corporation of an orb-web corporation. For example, in Walkovsky v. Carlton, 355 a taxicab hit a
pedestrian and injured him. 356 The pedestrian sued the corporation, which owned the taxicab.357
The corporation owned nine other corporations and each owned two other taxicabs with minimum

348

SUP. CT. R. 29.6.

349

SUP. CT. R. 29.6.

350

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929-30.

351

Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 95 (1926) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (“when the sacrifice is so
essential to the end that some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld.”).
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See Alberto v. Diversified Grp., Inc., 55 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that piercing the corporate
veil is not favored in general, and the courts are reluctant to do so); In re KZK Livestock, Inc., 221 B.R. 471, 478
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998).
353

Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569–70 (7th Cir. 1985).

354

Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 96 F.2d 693, 704-05 (10th Cir. 1938), rev’d on other grounds,
306 U.S. 307 (1939).
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Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414 (1966).
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Id. at 416.
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Id. at 419.
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insurance coverage required by the State law. 358 Moreover, the corporations operated out of the
same garage in New York City using the same dispatching system. 359 The New York Court held
that the brother or sister corporations were not responsible because the enterprise did not become
either illicit or fraudulent merely because it consisted ofmany such corporations. 360 Carlton
presents an example of a domestic U.S. corporation. 361 Thus, the plaintiff could have been entitled
under a respondent superior or an agency theory to hold the enterprise responsible for the acts of
its agents. 362
The alter-ego theory suggests the presence if a parent company exerts substantial control
over a subsidiary and shares the same integrated distribution system with the subsidiary for
purposes of asserting jurisdiction. 363 To establish jurisdiction under this theory, the courts consider
numerous factors: (1) common employees and offices; (2) central accounting system; (3) payment
of wages by one corporation to another corporation’s employees; (4) common business name; (5)
services by the employees of one corporation on behalf of another corporation; (6) transfer of
undocumented funds between corporations; and (7) allocation of unclear profits and losses
between corporations. 364
A party bringing a veil-piercing claim bears the burden of showing that the corporation is
in fact a “dummy or sham” for another person or entity. 365 In determining whether two
corporations are truly separate, significant factors to consider include adequacy of capitalization,
overlapping directorates and officers, separate record keeping, payment of taxes and filing of

358

Id. at 416

359

Id.

360

Id. at 417 (“the courts will disregard the corporate form, or, to use accepted terminology, ‘pierce the
corporate veil,’ whenever necessary ‘to prevent fraud or to achieve equity.’”).
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See infra Part III.
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Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d at 420 (“a larger corporate entity composed of many corporations which, under
general principles of agency, would be liable to each other’s creditors in contract and in tort.”); KLEIN, RAMSEYER,
AND BRAINBRIGE, BUS. ASS’NS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 191 (7th
ed. 2009).
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Indah v. U.S. S.E.C., 661 F.3d 914, 921 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp.
Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2008); see also In re Silicon Gel Brest Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F.
Supp. 1447, 1452 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (stating that when a corporation is so controlled as to be the alter ego or mere
instrumentality of its stockholders, the corporate form may be disregarded in the interests of justice).
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PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 173-74 (Tex. 2007) (describing a “single
business enterprise” approach).
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See, e.g., Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini–Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 378-79, 380 (7th
Cir. 2008) (“dummy or sham” corporations); Home-Stake Prod. Co. v. Talon Petrol., C.A., 907 F.2d 1012, 1021 (10th
Cir. 1990) (refusing to “impute to the dominated corporation the forum contacts of its alter ego”); Fields v. Sedgwick
Associated Risks, Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] parent corporation’s ties to a forum do not create
personal jurisdiction over the subsidiary.”).
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consolidated returns, maintenance of separate bank accounts, level of parental financing and
control over the subsidiary, and the subsidiary’s authority over day-to-day operations. 366
Although the Court in Goodyear touched upon it, the presence theory based on a piercing
corporate veil is still uncertain because the State laws often interfere with the corporate veil theory,
especially in the absence of any precedents. 367 This is especially true because often the state courts
follow local business laws, but theoretically an orb-web corporation can be present through
piercing a corporate veil in an appropriate situation. 368
D. Presence: A Consent Theory (or a Waiver)
The consent and waiver approaches of the presence model are “two sides of the same coin.”
A consent approach generally applies as an alternative to a principal place of business and a state
of incorporation. In an orb-web corporation case, all domestic and foreign subsidiaries of a parent
(or an orb) are automatically consented to the United States’ jurisdiction. 369
The concept of consent is a traditional basis of jurisdiction that predates the minimum
contacts model that as set forth in International Shoe. A consent arguably be upheld even in the
absence of the minimum contacts. 370 Traditionally, the states cannot compel a non-resident
corporation to be adjudicated in the state court or to refrained from invoking the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. 371 It is certainly fair to hold a party responsible to the court in which the party has
deliberately and voluntarily engaged in a litigation-inducing behavior. 372 Professor Miller stated
“the concept of consent grows problematic when the law extends beyond its core of thoughtful and
deliberate action.” 373
366

See 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 43, 194 (Cum. Supp. 1987);
see also Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1988) (indicating that the concept of complete
domination by the parent is decisive); Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1459 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that courts
have generally declined to find alter ego liability based on a parent corporation’s use of a cash management system);
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 34 (D. Mass. 1987) (emphasizing that a
centralized cash management system […] where the accounting records always reflect the indebtedness of one entity
to another, is not the equivalent of intermingling funds); Japan Petroleum Co. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456
F. Supp. 831, 846 (D. Del. 1978) (stating that arrangements by a parent and subsidiary for economy of expense and
convenience of administration may be made without establishing the relationship of principal and agent).
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See Lonnie S. Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U PA. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2004);
see also Daniel G. Brown, Comment, Jurisdiction Over a Corporation on the Basis of the Contacts of an Affiliated
Corporation: Do You Have to Pierce the Corporate Veil?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 595, 595 (1992).
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See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 108.53, 108–95 (3d ed. 2009).
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Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
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Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) (stating that a State court, as a condition of using its new motor
vehicle highways, requires out of State motorists to file certificates consenting to the State’s jurisdiction).
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PROFESSOR MILLER, supra note 39, at 37.
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Generally, consent is not required to occur within certain time limit. Under the traditional
consent theory of jurisdiction, a party may consent to a court’s jurisdiction prior to the suit’s
institution or at the time suit is brought or after suit has started. 374 And having objected to the
absence of in personam jurisdiction, a defendant may rescind the objection, i.e., consent to the
forum court’s jurisdiction, at any stage of the proceedings. 375 It is easy and understandable that an
individual can consent to the jurisdiction. However, in case of a corporation, how consent can be
acquired?
In the recent cases, the Court overlooked the consent approach of presence model. 376 All
cases decided after International Shoe, were under the minimum contacts model.
1. Consent: A Corporation’s Voluntary Submission to a Forum State
If a corporate subsidiary is doing business in a forum state, then the subsidiary, at least
with respect to that business, has voluntarily submitted to that State’s jurisdiction. 377 One of the
oldest tenets of personal jurisdiction is that if a non-resident corporate defendant voluntary submits
to the jurisdiction of a forum state, then the consent to the forum state is satisfied automatically. 378
A non-resident corporate defendant may manifest consent to a court’s in personam jurisdiction in
any number of ways, from failure seasonably to interpose a jurisdictional defense, to express
acquiescence in the prosecution of a cause in a given forum, or to submission implied from a
conduct. 379
An equally well-established principle is that a state may exact from the nonresident, as a
condition of performing some activity in the state, consent to personal jurisdiction. 380 Similarly,
when a corporation is “present” or incorporated in a forum state, voluntary consent automatically
satisfies. 381
Consent not only applies to defendants but also applies to plaintiffs. Likewise, consent
satisfies when a plaintiff voluntarily submits to the defendant’s state for jurisdiction. It is the price
that the plaintiff must pay to the state for allowing him or her to litigate in its courts. There is
nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating the plaintiff as being there for all purposes for which

374

Gen. Contracting & Trading C. v. Interpole, Inc., 940 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1991).
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Id.

376

See sources cited in supra notes 4-8.

377

Cf. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929-30 (stating that a North Carolina subsidiary is not responsible for foreign
subsidiaries’ tortious acts but that the parent can be challenged based on enterprise liability).
378

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 47.

379

See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939); Marcial Ucin, S.A. v. SS
Galicia, 723 F.2d 994, 996 (1st Cir. 1983).
380

See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).

381

See discussion supra Part II.A-C.
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justice to the defendant requires his presence 382 In certain situations, parties may agree in a
contractual situation by consenting to jurisdiction of the forum by bringing a lawsuit in that
forum. 383 When a defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the court by appearance, consent is
satisfied. 384 Likewise, “implied consent is established when the defendant’s activities manifest an
intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.” 385 The voluntariness prong ensures that the
“defendant’s contacts” with the forum State are “not based on the unilateral actions of another
party or a third person.” 386
One of the most solidly established ways of giving such consent is to designate an agent
for service of process within the State.387 The principal may not expressly or impliedly require
consent by an agent as a condition of authority, and the agent’s exercise of power within its scope
of authority during the term for which it was given or within reasonable time will bind the
principal. 388
In the case of parent-subsidiary relationship, a relevant question raises great practical
significance such as in Goodyear that whether a parent or a subsidiary can consent through one
another for tortious conduct by a parent or its other subsidiary. 389 The Supreme Court’s decision
in Goodyear provides the proposition that when a sister-subsidiary consents to a State court’s
jurisdiction, the other sister-subsidiaries of the parent corporation are not construed to have
consented to the forum State’s jurisdiction, but rather requires each subsidiary’s individual consent
or similar understanding to that effect. 390 In Goodyear, the Court stated that Goodyear’s North
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Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938).
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See discussion infra Part II.D.3.
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Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982).
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Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514, 523 (6th Cir. 2011).
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SeeI e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Inves., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 716 (1996) (citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
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See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (f); see also Hans Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1031, 1032-71 (1961) (describing the importance of procedural rule in domestic and international
settings).
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See generally 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 274 (3d ed. 1959); Nat'l Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964). In National Equipment, the plaintiff, a New York corporation, had
leased equipment to the defendant, a Michigan farmer, under a form agreement that on its back appointed for the
Michigan lessee farmer a New York resident to accept service of process. The plaintiff corporation sued the farmer in
New York, and the farmer defaulted. The Court held that the parties’ appointment clause served as a consent to
jurisdiction in the State of New York with which the farmer may not have the requisite minimum contacts under the
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PETER HAY, supra note 12, at 85, n.6.

See Global Presence, GOODYEAR CORPORATE, http://www.goodyear.com/corporate/about/facilities.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2017) (showing that Goodyear tire and Rubber Corp. has world headquarters in Akron, OH. The
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(6) Latin America. Goodyear USA is incorporated under the laws of New York and has plants in 21 locations in North
America only. New York is also a principal place of business for Goodyear’s North America segments. In North
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Carolina corporation did not object to the North Carolina State court’s assertion of jurisdiction. 391
Thus, Goodyear’s North Carolina Corporation consented or voluntarily submitted to the North
Carolina State court’s jurisdiction. 392 The Court found, however, that the same may not be true for
subsidiaries Goodyear Turkey, Goodyear Luxemburg and Goodyear France. 393 Although the
defendant may raise a defense of consent or waiver, 394 when a claim is related to a subsidiary’s
action in tort, the doctrine of vicarious liability arises, 395 and an orb-web parent can be liable
without any exception.
2. Consent: A Corporation’s Registration with a Forum State
The registration theory raises various difficult questions yet to be answered. A number of
State and federal courts follow the consent theory, based on a registration approach that has
remained unsuccessful. 396 Nevertheless, a corporation’s voluntary registration to do business in a
State is an automatic consent to jurisdiction, and such consent is a part of a bargain by which the
corporation agrees to accept certain obligations in return for the right to do business in the State. 397
In a very early case, Pennsylvania Fire Insurance, the Court established the proposition that a
State may exercise general jurisdiction over any foreign corporation that registered to do business
in that State, which satisfies due process, but the proposition raised the question of constitutionality
after Pennoyer and International Shoe and its progeny. 398 In Pennsylvania Fire Insurance, Justice
Holmes articulated that the defendant corporation’s designation of the Missouri Commissioner of
Insurance as corporation’s local agents. In International Shoe, the Court established that when a
foreign corporation has not expressly consented to a State’s jurisdiction by registration, “minimum
contacts” with that State can provide a due process basis for finding implied consent to the State’s
Carolina, Goodyear operates three plants, and it is incorporated there. In this context, the North Carolina plant is a
sister-subsidiary of Goodyear, and not a parent corporation).
391

See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 916 (stating that “[i]n contrast to the parent company, Goodyear USA, which
does not contest the North Carolina courts’ personal jurisdiction over it, petitioners are not registered to do business
in North Carolina.”).
392

See supra text and accompanying notes 369-83.
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See discussion supra Part I.
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See Jardines Bacata, Ltd. v. Diaz-Marquez, 878 F.2d 1555, 1559 (1st Cir. 1989).
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Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that a claim against a principal for deliberate
indifference based upon the master’s knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by its agent).
396

See Agribusiness United DMCC v. Blue Water Shipping Comp., 2017 WL 1354144, No. H-16-2249, at
*5 (S. D.Tex., 2017) (describing that although the defendant was registered to do Business in Texas, it did not have
personal jurisdiction); Figueroa v. BNSF R. Comp., 390 P. 3d 1019,1020 (Or. 2017) (stating that appointment of
registered agent does not mean that the corporation is consented to the jurisdiction)
397

In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp 1265, 1278 (D. Md. 1981) (citing Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 175 (1939)).
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jurisdiction. 399 However, implied (or express) consent is automatically satisfied when the U.S.
based orb-web corporation has established a world headquarters in the United States. 400
Can a court assert jurisdiction if a State has an interest in the litigation, and the litigation
has casual connection with the forum State? The well-settled principle provides that when a
corporation authorizes an agent to receive a service of process in compliance with the requirements
of a State-registration statute, the corporation has consented in any action that is within the scope
of the agent’s authority and subject to the jurisdiction of that forum State. 401 When a defendant
corporation applies for a certificate of authority and designates the Secretary of the State as its
attorney for process, the defendant corporation has consented to be sued in a court in that forum
State. 402 Consent is also satisfied when a defendant applies for and receives an authorization to
do business in the forum State. 403
Nonetheless, the registration theory is still a very problematical because each time the
courts have used different languages and illustrated various approaches of registration. For
example, in Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., the Fourth Circuit Court held that the
corporation’s registration is merely applying and qualifying to do business in the State, not actually
doing business. 404 However, in Knowlton v. Alied Vanlines, Inc., the Eighth Circuit Court held that
registration and appointment of an agent for a service of process was consent to jurisdiction,
including consent to general jurisdiction, over an action unrelated to the forum State. 405 In Wenche
Siemer v. Lerjet Acquisition Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court held that the registration and an
399
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appointment of an agent does not constitute consent to jurisdiction, and it is unconstitutional. 406 In
addition, the court said that an exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation is
constitutionally permissible only when the foreign corporation’s continuous and systematic
contacts create a “general business presence” in the forum State…[,] “being qualified to do
business...‘is of no special weight’ in evaluating general personal jurisdiction[,]” and “a foreign
corporation that properly complies with the Texas registration statute only consents to personal
jurisdiction where such jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible. 407
Inconsistent and different decisions by federal courts suggest that the courts are not firm
on the principle of registration.
3. Consent: A Contractual Relationship by a Forum Selection Clause
Parties to a contract may consent to litigate disputes in a particular forum by inserting a
forum selection clause into their contract. 408 Courts must give effect to . . . freely negotiated forum
selection clauses. 409 If so, the only relevant inquiry for the courts is whether the forum selection
clause is enforceable unless fraud, duress, or other coercive factors are present, which may
preclude the consenting corporations from contesting on personal jurisdiction, unless they can
clearly show that an enforcement of the clause was unreasonable. 410 Generally, a forum selection
clause “designates that all disputes arising out of a contract must be litigated in the courts of a
specific State. Not all forum selection clauses designate an exclusive forum. Many simply State
that the parties consent to be sued in the courts of the specific State.” 411
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As a general proposition, a defendant can consent to personal jurisdiction by entering into
a contract containing a valid forum selection clause. 412 With respect to jurisdictional analysis, a
corporation may be involved in a tortious act but may not be involved in any contractual
relationship with the other party or a forum State. In the United States, the jurisdictional law on
contract and tort claims functions differently. 413 Nevertheless, in International Shoe, the Court
stretched the point, in dicta, that a corporation’s tortious act might impose obligation or liability,
but due process might satisfy in such a tortious cause of action if nature, quality, and circumstances
of the cause of action warrant. 414 Another example case is World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, a product liability case, which involved no contractual relation with the forum State.
The Court recognized that besides the contract and tort cause of action in deciding jurisdiction,
there are other factors to be considered such as reasonableness and fairness to the defendant. 415 In
Calder v. Jones, the Court applied the effect test and held that California had jurisdiction over
individual defendants for their tortious act because their action was intentional and expressly aimed
at the forum State; therefore, jurisdiction is proper in California based on effects of the Florida
defendant’s conduct in California. 416
The effect test established in Calder is similar to that of Brussel I regulation, which is quite
clear that a single tort will support jurisdiction.417 Under the Brussel I regulation, the State with
jurisdiction over the principal defendant also has a jurisdiction over a third-party defendant for the
purposes of claims for contribution or liability, and in such case no affiliation or third-party
defendant need to be shown. In contrast, in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 418 the Court was concerned that foreign retaliation issues might raise in extraterritorial
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cases if the US law were to be imposed. 419 However, the subsidiaries of a U.S. parent corporation
have already consented to jurisdiction of the United States courts by accepting the parent
corporation’s world headquarters, and thus, dual citizenship of the subsidiaries is satisfied.
However, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 420 the plaintiff was an American company
incorporated in Delaware with its principal office in Illinois. The company manufactured and
distributed toiletries and hair products in the United States and abroad. 421 The plaintiff expanded
its overseas operations in Germany under the ownership of a German entity. 422 Pursuant to their
contract agreement, the German entity transferred its ownership along with all rights and
trademarks to the plaintiff. 423 Their contract also contained a number of express warranties and
choice-of-law provisions and that “[t]he laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and
govern their agreement, its interpretation and performance.” 424 Later, the plaintiff discovered that
the trademark rights it purchased under the contract were subject to substantial encumbrances that
threatened to give others superior rights and restrict or preclude the plaintiff’s use of them. 425 The
plaintiff commenced an action against the German entity. 426 In deciding personal jurisdiction, the
Court found that “[t]wo policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this case.” 427 One is the
choice of law provision and the Securities Act of 1933 both were ‘[d]esigned to protect investors
and to require “issuers, underwriters, and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the character
of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and to prevent fraud in their sale by creating
a special right to recover for misrepresentation.” 428 These types of challenges draw the attention
of practitioners to look beyond the facts of the case because a contract between a parent and
subsidiary often carries special contractual terms, including indemnification.
E. Importance of an Adequate Notice to Subsidiaries Located Outside the United States:
The Hague Convention
Service of process outside the forum was not allowed in Pennoyer. Later, in International
Shoe, the Court allowed a service of process outside the State’s border. Later still, Congress
419
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allowed under the Hague Convention service of process outside the United States’ border by
signing a multilateral treaty that provided a simpler way to serve a process abroad, ensured
defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions (in the United States) would receive actual and timely
notice of suit, and facilitated proof of service abroad. 429 When a domestic corporation is not a
subsidiary of the foreign-born orb corporation, then service on the domestic corporation does not
effectuate proper service on the foreign company (or the orb corporation) if the companies do not
own corporate stock of each other, and do not share expenses profits, losses, office facilities,
bookkeeping, equipment or other property. 430 When a corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary
maintain separate corporate identities, “though perhaps merely formal,” service on the subsidiary
is not a valid service on its parent, despite the identity of interests between the parent and its
subsidiary and despite control by the parent over the subsidiary’s operations. 431
The Convention applies to choice of court agreements “concluded in civil or commercial
matters.” 432 The Convention excludes consumer and employment contracts and certain specified
subject matters. 433 The reasons for these exclusions are, in most cases, the existence of more
specific international instruments, and national, regional, or international rules that claim exclusive
jurisdiction for some of these matters. 434 An agreement designating one or more specific courts in
a contracting State is deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided
otherwise. 435 In addition, a contracting state may declare that it will recognize and enforce
judgments given by courts designated in a non-exclusive choice of court agreement. 436
Under the Hague Convention, “[s]ervice of process refers to a formal delivery of
documents that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action,” as
determined by the otherwise applicable State rules governing the method of service. 437 In case of
service of process for a foreign corporation, the Hague Convention is applicable, and its provisions
preempt inconsistent methods of service prescribed by State law. 438 Thus, when one of the parties
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is a foreign defendant (or a foreign plaintiff), service of process must comport with the Hague
Convention. 439
In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa (“Aerospatiale”), 440 the Court suggested that the discovery rules set forth
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention are the law of the United
States. 441 The Court explained that if the Hague Convention is used as the exclusive means for
obtaining evidence located abroad, then every American court hearing a case involving a
contracting State must follow the internal laws of that State. 442
Since both The Hague Convention and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are authorized by
the federal statues, comity and federalism concern may not apply when requesting a document
from the foreign signatory states because these states have arguably consented by signing the treaty
with the United States. 443 Hence, for example, in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.,444
the Court said that a
[t]reaty is in the nature of a contract between nations. Under the doctrine of “rebus
sic stantibus,” a nation which is party to a treaty might conceivably invoke changed
circumstances as an excuse for terminating its obligations under the treaty. But
when the parties to a treaty continue to assert its vitality a private person who finds
the continued existence of the treaty inconvenient may not invoke the doctrine on
their behalf. 445
Our Constitution states that treaties are the supreme law of the land. 446 For example, in
Bacardi Corporation of America v. Deomnech, 447 the Court held that “every mark duly registered
or legally protected in one of the contracting States shall be admitted to registration or deposit and
legally protected in the other contracting States, upon compliance with the formal provisions of
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the domestic law of such States.” 448 Bacardi Corporation of America, a Pennsylvania corporation,
authorized and entitled to manufacture and sell rum in Puerto Rico under the trademark and label
of Compania Ron Bacardi, S.A., a Cuban corporation. 449 The parties maintained their contractual
terms for more than 20 years. 450 Despite the prohibition in Cuba, the defendant sold rum in Puerto
Rico and throughout the United States under the trademark, which included the word “Bacardi” or
“Bacardi y Cia.” 451 The trademark was duly registered in the United States Patent Office and in
the Office of the Executive Secretary of Puerto Rico. 452 The Court held that when a treaty becomes
law through ratification, then no special legislation is necessary to make it effective. 453
Accordingly, when filing a case against such foreign corporation, practitioners must
determine whether there are treaties or international agreements. However, U.S. procedural laws
do not allow the discovery until a case is filed in a court. 454 Extensive discovery could be a viable
option, but it is not a right option due to costs involved in the discovery process. 455 Even though a
parent and subsidiaries are separate entities, they are nevertheless bound by anticompetitive
conduct clauses and to redress anticompetitive harm through indemnification. Under these sets of
considerations, a U.S.-born orb-web corporation should be treated as one web under the presence
model.
III. GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER U.S. SUBSIDIARIES OF FOREIGN-BORN, ORB-WEB
CORPORATIONS
A. Introduction of Current Law
It would be unwise to assume jurisdiction over a foreign-born orb-web corporation without
first analyzing the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which says
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
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deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 456
Arguably, when a corporation is not a citizen of the United States, the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot be asserted on an orb-web corporation’s parent. 457 Under the equality notion,
one nation cannot impose its rule on others even though the imposing nation has a right to do so. 458
A foreign-born orb-web corporation operates its businesses in the United States in three different
ways: (a) by incorporating a subsidiary in the United States, 459 (b) by establishing an agency in the
United States, 460 or (c) by establishing a shell corporation in the United States. 461 Often these
subsidiaries have some sort of contract with the host nation. 462
If an orb-web corporation is not born in the United States, but operates its business in the
United States through its subsidiary incorporated in the United States, then the state courts can
establish general jurisdiction under the presence model over the subsidiary only as an independent
domestic corporation. 463 The crux of the relationship requires a determination as to whether due
process is satisfied. In Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 464 the Court said:
The question is not on the powers of a corporation, but as to whom and to what
objects those powers can be exerted. A corporation is the creature of the law, and
it is clothed with all the powers of a person. The position, on the other side, is that
when it leaves the State, which gave it existence by granting its charter, it loses its
personal existence, and has no existence whatever. This is a harsh doctrine, and
seems at war with the principles of those who assert and maintain State rights. 465
Although it is true that a corporation is a person, citizenship of a corporation is different
from a citizenship of an individual. Once an individual moves out of a State with intent to reside
in some other State, then the new place where the individual intends to reside qualifies as a new
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domicile of that individual. 466 However, in the case of a corporation, citizenship is granted where
the corporation is born and one other place where the corporation runs its business. 467
However, the problem for practitioners is determining whether the corporation is an orbweb corporation and whether the orb-web corporation is born in the United States (or abroad). For
example, in Goodyear, the plaintiff did not raise a corporate disclosure, which showed that any
subsidiary that owned more than 10% of a parent company must be alleged and disclosed to claim
enterprise liability. 468 Perhaps, a simple company portfolio would have revealed where the
Goodyear subsidiaries were positioned Goodyear’s corporate web.
B. A Plaintiff’s Responsibility of Simple Discovery
As a practical matter, discovering who or what is central to the sources of controversy that
must be identified. For example, for an orb-web corporation born in the United States, it would be
comparatively easy for practitioners to determine who is the parent and who is the subsidiary.
However, when only a subsidiary corporation of a foreign parent is present in the United States,
this analysis becomes very complex, if a plaintiff decides to sue a foreign parent (orb) corporation.
Therefore, practitioners must identify, as the first step of litigation, corporate name, State or States
of incorporation, dates of incorporation, names and principal places of business, States where the
corporation is licensed to transact business, charter number, issuance date, and whether a license
to transact business was ever expired or revoked. 469
Practitioners should also attempt to gather each date upon which a present or former officer,
agent, or employee of the corporation has been physically present in the state in past years; the
corporation’s mailing address; 470 and any corporate products, goods or services performed,
manufactured, processed, or sold by the corporation; general descriptions of products sold and
these transactions’ volume. 471 In addition, general web-search may reveal a great deal of publicly
available information, such as revenue generated by the corporation and its subsidiaries as one
unit, the name of the parent and all affiliated subsidiaries, and goods and products sold in the
territory, state, country, or continent. 472
Orb-web-corporations are extremely complex and most cases were lost in this process of
identifying the true corporate structure. For example, in Lots Co. Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision
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Industry Co., 473 the plaintiff was a Taiwanese electronics manufacturing company 474 that
specialized in designing and manufacturing USB connectors for notebook computers in China.475
Plaintiff generally sold its USB connectors to Chinese companies (“ODMs”), which then made
and assembled computer products, incorporating USB connectors for many well-known computer
brands, such as Acer, Dell, HP, and Apple. 476 Those name-brand computer products, in turn, made
their way into the hands of consumers and businesses around the world, including the United
States. 477 The evidence was presented to the court that roughly 94% of global notebook computers
were assembled by ODMs. 478 The federal district court found that the relationship among the
“defendants” 479 was not clear.
Defendant Hon Hai is an orb-web corporation founded in 1974 by Hon Hai Precision
Industry Company Ltd., anchor company of Hon Hai / Foxconn Technology Group. Hon Hai
devoted itself to integrating expertise in mechanical and electrical parts and an uncommon concept
to provide the lowest “total cost” solution to increase the affordability of electronics products for
all mankind. 480 The corporation also claims that
Today, Hon Hai / Foxconn Technology Group is the most dependable partner for
joint-design, joint-development, manufacturing, assembly and after-sales services
to global Computer, Communication and Consumer-electronics (“3C”) leaders.
Aided by its legendary green manufacturing execution, uncompromising customer
473
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devotion and its award-winning proprietary business model, eCMMS, Hon Hai has
been the most trusted name in contract manufacturing services (including CEM,
EMS, ODM and CMMS) in the world. 481
As an orb-web corporation, Hon Hai expanded its business within a very short time and
currently possesses a net capital of $147,934,068,630. 482 The plaintiff brought an action against
these defendants alleging that they competed with the patent to control and gain monopoly over
USB connectors, in violation of the Sherman Act and State law. 483 Given this case’s particular
facts, how should the courts determine the jurisdiction under the existing minimum contacts
model?
As noted, one of the defendants was from the U.S. and subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States. 484 It may also have been likely that the U.S. defendant was a subsidiary
of Hon Hai/Foxconn. 485 The court noted the difficulties of identifying the corporate relationship
between the defendants because the lower courts do not have guidance to determine such cases
and individual plaintiffs are unable to set forth a prima facie case by showing a corporate
governance of such a foreign-born, orb-web corporation. 486
The preliminary search may provide the information about which corporation is a parent
of an orb-web corporation and which corporations are its subsidiaries. This may enable the
practitioners to identify whom to sue: a parent, subsidiaries, or an agent. Although web information
may not provide a plaintiff an authority, it would certainly help.
C. A Foreign-born, Orb-Web Corporation’s Incorporated Subsidiaries in the United
States
These types of corporations are web corporations, either vertically or horizontally, attached
with a parent (orb) corporation and provide necessary resources to the orb. Although they are part
of the same web construction, a parent is not born in the United States (but born abroad), so it will
not be fair to call up the parent for its subsidiary’s fault in tort or personal injury cause of actions
in the United States unless some other lawful means are available. 487
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At least two precedent cases, Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. Los Angeles 488 and Bauman, offer
that the state courts cannot preclude a U.S. plaintiff from adjudicating a claim against a subsidiary
of a foreign-born, orb-web parent. 489 By fair means, such a foreign-born parent corporation may
be burdened by the laws of the country in which it was born--in the same way as a U.S. born orbweb corporation is bound by the United States laws. 490
For example, in Japan Line, Ltd., the Court said that “more elaborate inquiry” is needed
when a State seeks to tax foreign instrumentalities rather than domestic businesses engaged in
interstate commerce. 491 The Court set two-part inquiries:
first, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of
international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal
Government from “speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations
with foreign governments.” If a State tax contravenes either of these precepts, it is
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. 492
The Court reasoned that in former, the goal is to avoid multiple taxation of the
instrumentalities of foreign commerce, and in the latter, signing a convention to reflect a national
policy to remove impediments as “instruments of international traffic.” 493 However, Congress has
adopted flexibility and allowed States to regulate “matters of local state concern, even though in
some measure it affects commerce, provided it does not materially restrict the free flow of
commerce across state lines, or interfere with it in matters with respect to which uniformity of
regulation is of predominant national concern.” 494 In addition, the interpretation of the Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation Treaty is generally controlling unless it provides a result that is
inconsistent with an intent or expectation of its signatories. 495
In Bauman, on the other hand, the plaintiffs argued that Daimler could be sued based on
its agency relationship or a subsidiary relationship with MBUSA. 496 California’s long-arm statute
allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction “to the full extent permissible under the United States
488
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489

See infra Parts III.D, E.
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Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 425 U.S. 637, 642 (1976) (“We are unable to say that the treatment of
foreign corporations affected by Exception 27 constitutes discrimination repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause.
The gist of appellant’s argument is that, because Exception 27 does not require that plaintiff demonstrate the existence
of his cause of action, there was ‘[d]enied to appellant...a virtually unique opportunity afforded to domestic
corporations, to preview its adversary’s case in chief except as to the extent of damages’”).
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Constitution.”497 Daimler argued that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its
parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego. 498 Upholding the
minimum contacts model, the Court held that Daimler was not “at home” 499 and could not be sued
for injuries in California. 500 The Court said that it had not yet addressed whether a foreign
corporation may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-State
subsidiary. 501
The Court reasoned that neither Daimler nor MBUSA was incorporated in California, nor
did either entity have its principal place of business there. 502 If Daimler’s California activities
sufficed to allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in California, the same global reach
would presumably be available in every other State in which MBUSA had sizable sales.503 Such
exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-State defendants “to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and
will not render them liable to suit. 504
However, in doing so, the Court did not consider the risk of loss shifting from orb-web
corporations to the individuals harmed by their actions even though the orb-web corporation had
a massive presence in multiple States and in multiple countries. 505 Justice Sotomayor was
concerned that a U.S. business might enter into a contract with a foreign country to sell its products,
but may not be able to seek relief in any U.S. court if the multinational company breaches the
contract, even if that company has considerable operations in numerous U.S. forums.506
Nevertheless, it precludes a plaintiff, in these examples, from seeking legal recourse anywhere in
the United States even if no other judicial system is available to provide relief. 507 Justice
Sotomayor also made a wonderful comment concerning “the change in the navigation of the time”
that
The proportionality approach will treat small businesses unfairly in comparison to
national and multinational conglomerates. Whereas a larger company will often be
497
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immunized from general jurisdiction in a State on account of its extensive contacts
outside the forum, a small business will not be. For instance, the majority holds
today that Daimler is not subject to general jurisdiction in California despite its
multiple offices, continuous operations, and billions of dollars’ worth of sales there.
But imagine a small business that manufactures luxury vehicles principally
targeting the California market and that has substantially all of its sales and
operations in the State—even though those sales and operations may amount to
one-thousandth of Daimler’s. Under the majority’s rule, that small business will be
subject to suit in California on any cause of action involving any of its activities
anywhere in the world, while its far more pervasive competitor, Daimler, will not
be. That will be so even if the small business incorporates and sets up its
headquarters elsewhere (as Daimler does), since the small business’ California
sales and operations would still predominate when “apprais[ed]” in proportion to
its minimal “nationwide and worldwide” operations. 508
Ironically, Daimler AG claims that special items affect its earnings before interests and
taxes, including (a) restricting its own dealer network; (b) relocation of MBUSA’s headquarters;
(c) sales of real estate in the United States. 509 Daimler AG also says that out of 460 units (in
thousands of cars) sold in 2015, only 65 units (in thousands) were sold in Germany while 88 units
sold in the United States. 510 Daimler Financial Services provide 108.9 billion euros worth of
revenue, out of which the United States and Latin America contributed 48.5 billion euros. 511
Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), headquartered in Montvale, New Jersey, is responsible
for the distribution, marketing, and customer service for all Mercedes-Benz products in the United
States. 512 Daimler made a public statement that its individual business unit set yet another record
in the second quarter and sold more than 500,000 passenger cars, 20% more than the last quarter. 513
In the year 2015, it sold more than 960,000 vehicles, 19% increase over the same period last
year. 514 Daimler claimed that due to relocation of MBUSA headquarters, Daimler lost 20 million
euros. 515
28 U.S.C. § 1350 provides that the district court shall have an original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of any civil nations or treaty of the

508
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United States taken by an alien. 516 Nevertheless, the Court stated that Daimler AG and MBUSA
had an independent contractor agreement under which the parties agreed that MBUSA would not
be liable against any claim against Daimler AG because MBUSA was not an agent of Daimler
under their contract and thus no agency relationship was established. 517 The Court’s decision is
incorrect for several reasons. 518 First, there should be no exception under this fact alone that
jurisdiction depends upon the state of things when the action is brought. 519 Second, the Court has
recognized the citizenship of general and limited partners when determining the citizenship of
parties. 520 Third, Daimler AG has established the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility
stating that
Such a culture enables us to provide our employees with adequate compensation in
line with the concept of equal treatment. We ensure their health and occupational
safety, support their professional advancement, and safeguard their basic rights on
the job. We strive to create working conditions that promote a work-life balance.
To these ends, we work together with employee representatives in a spirit of trust,
abiding by the Principles of Social Responsibility that Daimler has agreed upon
together with employee representatives throughout the Group. 521
Fourth, this case provided substantial reasons to assert jurisdiction over the subsidiary of
the foreign-born, orb-web corporation under the presence model 522 because the Full Faith and
Credit Clause allows jurisdiction over a corporate subsidiary who is residing (permanently) in the
United States. 523 Although the Fourteenth Amendment and Full Faith and Credit Clause would not
be applicable to the foreign parent (orb) corporation, these constitutional provisions enacted in
consideration to provide the protection to the United States citizens and its permanent residents. 524
Therefore, the Court should recognize the State courts’ jurisdiction over a subsidiary of a foreignborn, orb-web corporation in future cases.
D. A Foreign-Born, Orb-Web Corporation’s Operations through an Agent

516

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.

517

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 760, n.15.

518

See infra text and accompanying notes 518-23.

519

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004) (Scalia, J.)

520

See supra Parts I, II.

521

Corporate Governance: Integrity Code, DAIMLER,
https://www.daimler.com/documents/sustainability/integrity/daimler-integritycode.pdf (on file with the author).
522

See supra Part II.

523

See supra Part I.

524

See id.

THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

66

A foreign orb-web corporation’s relationship with its U.S. agency can be contractual in
nature. If a foreign corporation appoints an agent in the United States for a service of process, then
the agent is under contract with the foreign corporation to confer jurisdiction. 525 However, a proper
service upon the agent, under a valid State statute, constitutes consent to be sued in the federal
courts. 526 Congress had provided the federal courts concurrent jurisdiction with all fifty States. 527
Hence, this approach provides another avenue to determine jurisdiction.
E. A Foreign-Born, Orb-web Corporation’s Operations by Establishing a Shell
Corporation (or a Subsidiary) in the United States
A foreign-born, orb-web corporation’s operations through a shell subsidiary or fictitious
entity is often to create an illusion of a legitimate look to carry the parent corporation’s business
objectives. 528 The question of whether a corporation is a shell subsidiary is a fact-intensive inquiry
and requires extensive discovery. For example, in United States v. Daimler AG, 529 the Justice
Department (DOJ) claimed that Daimler AG, formerly Daimler Chrysler AG and Daimler Benz
AG (“Daimler”), sold vehicles all over the world including to government and other State-owned
entities. Individual and institutional investors owned Daimler. 530 In doing so, Daimler became an
issuer under the United States law, traded stocks in the New York Stock Exchange, and circulated
more than one billion shares. 531 The revenue received in these transactions was wired to U.S. bank
accounts or foreign bank accounts. 532 Daimler incorporated a shell company in the United States
to enter other stock exchanges. 533 The Federal District agreed with the DOJ and granted a little
over 93 million dollars in criminal penalty payable immediately to DOJ. 534
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In Holland v. United States, 535 the Court said that such shell corporations provide an
inference of willfulness by establishing a consistent pattern of underreporting large amounts of
income. 536 A corporation’s intent plays a major role in creating shell entities to conceal certain
unlawful acts or increase its net revenue. 537 Therefore, asserting jurisdiction over such subsidiaries
do not offend the traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice.
Hence, these subsidiaries should be treated as a domestic corporation and should follow
the same jurisdictional analysis as a domestic corporation in the United States as discussed in Parts
I-III.
IV. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS ENGAGED IN THE STREAM OF COMMERCE
A. Analysis under the Current Regime
Asserting jurisdiction in the State courts, in the stream-of-commerce cases, is notoriously
challenging compared to asserting jurisdiction over orb-web corporations. Because tort, contract,
and product liability are State substantive laws, and a State is obligated in protecting its citizens
from defective products that brings harm to its citizens. 538 In McIntyre, the Court explained that in
a typical stream of commerce case, a nonresident defendant acting outside the forum places a
product in the stream of commerce that ultimately causes harm inside a forum. 539 However, stream
of commerce cases are much different from what the Court has articulated in the past.
Initially, the Court identified stream of commerce issues 540 and introduced them to the
lower courts as the stream of commerce model, by using an existing minimum contacts model to
assert jurisdiction. 541 Following the Court’s identification of this new model, the lower courts
started to use it in their analysis as they were all bound by the Court’s precedents. 542 However, the
Court’s language in subsequent cases indicates that the minimum contacts model never meant to
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accommodate the stream of commerce analysis. 543 Thus, the Court’s language clearly raises the
concern that the minimum contacts model, once again, failed to provide successful resolution of
the structural ambiguity in personal jurisdiction. Hence, the minimum contacts analysis should be
abrogated, along with the distinction between the specific and general jurisdiction, in stream of
commerce cases.
Instead, there are two types of transactions that may be construed as stream of commerce
transactions: The first type is the stream of commerce through a private contract or a parentsubsidiary transaction. The second type is the international stream of commerce. 544 Asserting
jurisdiction over the former type of stream of commerce cases are relatively easier to adjudicate in
the State courts than the latter type. Hence, the stream of commerce and international stream of
commerce require distinct and separate analysis.
In stream of commerce cases, orb-web corporations are unlikely to be actual participants
because these types of corporations often conduct their businesses, as discussed in Part II, to avoid
any liability. 545 Thus, an orb-web corporation’s contractual relationship and liability pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and similar State procedural rules) may be easily traceable
and jurisdiction may be asserted, as discussed in Parts II and III. 546 If a plaintiff can show the
precise relationship of the defendant with the forum State or the United States, then most courts
will likely assert jurisdiction. 547
However, stream of commerce issues often arise not when there is an indirect effort to sell
products through stream of commerce by foreign or multinational corporations, but when a large
corporation or manufacturer or seller of goods distributes its goods through an extensive chain of
distribution as commingled products or through intermediaries. 548 To that end, there are two
discernible schools of thought in the stream of commerce model. 549 In the United States, interstate
and international commerce are controlled by Congress and by the executive branch through
various international treaties. 550 Therefore, a State court’s assertion of jurisdiction in the stream of
commerce cases require an alternative approach.
B. The Stream of Commerce Model
1. A Rise of Concept through a Private Contract or an Agency-Based
Transactions
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Any transaction between two business entities often starts with a contract including simple
“boilerplate contract terms,” including choice of law, warranty, trademark or licensing, and
indemnification clauses. 551 A stream of commerce theory was recognized, for the first time, by the
Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 552 In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiffs alleged that
while they were driving their newly purchased car purchased from the defendants, it exploded and
severely injured them. 553 The plaintiffs brought a products-liability claim in Oklahoma State court
against the defendants: (a) the automobile’s manufacturer, Audi NSU Auto Union
Aktiengesellschaft (Audi); (b) its importer Volkswagen of America, Inc. (Volkswagen); (c) its
regional distributor, petitioner World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. (World-Wide); and (d) its retail
dealer, petitioner Seaway. 554
World-Wide was incorporated and had its principal place of business in New York, which
distributed vehicles, parts, and accessories, under contract with Volkswagen, to retail dealers in
New York and two other States. 555 Seaway was incorporated and had its principal place of business
in New York. 556 The Court found that neither World-Wide nor Seaway did any business in
Oklahoma, shipped or sold any products to or from that State, had an agent to receive process
there, or purchased advertisements in any media calculated to reach the Oklahoma market. 557
Rather than looking at the defendants’ contractual relationship, the Court said that the corporate
defendants, automobile wholesaler, and retailer did not carry any activity in Oklahoma and did not
avail themselves of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. 558 The Court concluded that the
defendants did not have the “minimum contacts” with Oklahoma sufficient to permit the Oklahoma
courts to exercise jurisdiction even though the State long-arm statute conferred jurisdiction as
permitted by the United States Constitution. 559 The Court noted that the purpose of due process
was to provide reasonableness and fairness to the defendants, but mere foreseeability was not
enough. 560
There is no doubt that the stream of commerce notion explained in World-Wide
Volkswagen was clearly meant to protect an orb-web corporation like World-wide Volkswagen

551

See generally BARBARA CHILD, DRAFTING LEGAL DOCUMENTS 112 (2nd ed.1992)

552

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.

553

Id. at 288.

554

Id.

555

Id. at 289.

556

Id.

557

Id. at 295.

558

See id. at 295.

559

Id. at 289-90.

560

Id.

THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

70

and its affiliated entities. 561 For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen, first, there was a contractual
relationship between the parties, including the plaintiff, who purchased the defective the
products. 562 Second, the Court blended “the minimum contacts” analysis with purposeful
availment and the assertion of jurisdiction through the presence model based on the relationship. 563
Third, the Court pointed out that uniformity was not permissible under the Commerce Clause, and
the States were barred in asserting some economic activities. 564 Fourth, the Court said that
reasonableness factors could be asserted in the federal courts and not in the State courts, but the
State court could adjudicate whatever was present within its sovereign. 565 The last relevant point
the Court made was that the plaintiff voluntarily traveled to and sued in Oklahoma, and the
defendants did not sell any car in Oklahoma. 566 These four arguments completely negate the goal
of the minimum contacts model because the Court’s opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen had barred
the States from exercising jurisdiction over out-of-State defendants that are not “present.”
Under the stream of commerce theory, the Court held that the forum State was entitled to
assert jurisdiction if “a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.” 567 Thus, the Court
presented a new model, called the stream of commerce model, with a catch of “purposeful
availment.” 568
2. Limitations Placed in Stream of Commerce Cases
In the aftermath of World-Wide Volkswagen, many lower courts started to apply the stream
of commerce analysis under the minimum contacts model. 569 However, following the Court’s
discussion of this rule, which limited assertion of jurisdiction in the stream of commerce cases,
561

See supra diagram I.
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World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 289 (“Seaway and World-Wide are fully independent corporations
whose relations with each other and with Volkswagen and Audi are contractual only”). It is also likely that these
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subsequent cases had considerable opportunities to modify the rule. 570 Nevertheless, the Court in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. created two types of stream of commerce theories. 571 These early cases
raised differing conclusions, but a bar to these differing conclusions was only reached in McIntyre.
McIntyre presents a great example of the States’ limitations of the stream of commerce
theory. 572 In McIntyre, the plaintiff brought a product liability action against McIntyre, a British
manufacturer of a metal shearing machine, which severely injured the plaintiff’s hand while using
the machine. 573 The plaintiff was a New Jersey resident, was injured in New Jersey, and filed a
case in New Jersey State court. 574 New Jersey was a correct forum because the plaintiff was a
resident of the state, and the injury occurred in that state, and the defendant delivered its defective
product that state. 575 Influenced by the Court’s decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi,
the lower courts found that jurisdiction could not be asserted under the presence or minimum
contacts models but rather under the stream of commerce theory. 576
The Court, however, found against the plaintiff because he failed to establish a prima facie
case that exercise of jurisdiction was appropriate against the foreign defendant. 577 Viewed in this
light, the State of New Jersey had an unusually powerful interest in providing a convenient forum
for the injured plaintiff. 578 The Court held that a non-resident defendant may “purposefully avail
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws…. But the general rule is inapplicable in this products-liability case,
and the so-called ‘stream-of commerce’ doctrine cannot displace it.” 579 The Court said that the
Court’s decision in Asahi was responsible, in part, for the lower court’s decision to assert
jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory. 580
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Generally, product liability claims arise by businesses engaged in the stream of commerce
through exclusive distributors. 581 The Court’s approach in McIntyre undercuts the rationale that
these non-resident, foreign corporations certainly had consented to be sued in the United States by
specially targeting the United States market to sell their products. 582 Arguably, one who sells its
products in the United States and in the open market can be expected to be sued under an implied
consent theory or a contract-based theory or an agency theory. 583
3. Abrogation of State Long-Arm Statutes
Historically, State long-arm statutes were enacted in the wake of the Court’s decision in
International Shoe and its progeny. 584 In McIntyre, the New Jersey’s long-arm statute, Rule 4:44(b)(1), granted jurisdiction to adjudicate cases involving a non-resident corporate defendant to
the full extent permissible under the Constitution. 585 Put this way, States’ long-arm statutes are
enacted to provide access to their courts to enforce State laws. 586 In McIntyre, the Court sets a
ground that in products-liability cases, a defendant’s “purposeful availment” of the forum makes
581

Id. at 904 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“McIntyre UK dealt with the United States as a single market. Like
most foreign manufacturers, it was concerned not with the prospect of suit in State X as opposed to State Y, but
rather with its subjection to suit anywhere in the United States”); see supra discussion Part III.C.
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See supra text and accompanying note 537; Nicastro v. J. McIntyre Mech. Am. Ltd., 201 N.J. 48, 78-79
(2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). The New Jersey Supreme Court
noted that
Those attending the scrap metal trade shows and conventions came from areas other than
the cities hosting those events, and that the joint appearances by J. McIntyre and McIntyre America
were calculated efforts to penetrate the overall American market. Plaintiff’s employer, a New Jersey
businessman, is just one example of a person who traveled thousands of miles to a convention where,
by dint of a sales effort, he purchased one of J. McIntyre’s machines. J. McIntyre may not have had
access to McIntyre America’s customer list, but J. McIntyre knew or reasonably should have known
that its machines were being sold in States other than Ohio and in cities other than where the trade
conventions were held.
J. McIntyre and McIntyre America shared a common name that may have suggested to
unwitting members of the public some form of corporate relationship, despite the fact that both
companies were independent business entities with different owners and management. The
information sheet that accompanied the 640 Model Shear included J. McIntyre’s address and
telephone number and, according to the New Jersey businessman who purchased that machine, “had
we needed any repair parts, we would have called J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. in England, which is
where we would call today for repairs or parts.” There can be little doubt that J. McIntyre and
McIntyre America worked together to promote and sell J. McIntyre products in the United States as
evidenced by their shared communications and joint participation at industry trade conventions.
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jurisdiction consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 587 The Court’s
requirement of purposeful availment of the forum, however, bypasses the statutory authority
granted by the State legislatures. 588
The Court’s precise guideline in product liability cases continues to remain in some doubt.
For example, the McIntyre Court noted that “a defendant’s placing goods into the stream of
commerce “with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers within the forum State”
may indicate purposeful availment.” 589 The Court has advised that a defendant purposefully avails
if he has an office in a forum State, pays taxes, owns a property in the forum, advertises or sends
any employees to the forum. 590 These requirements give little guidance for determining what
constitutes “purposeful availment” and provide no guidance for determining whether a defendant
targets advertising to or sells his products in all fifty states.
Additionally, in Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., the Court held that “a corporation that engages
in a nationwide course of conduct cannot be held accountable in a [S]tate court by a group of
injured people unless all of those people were injured in the forum State.” 591 Under the majority
opinion, the Court made it very difficult for plaintiffs to sue a defendant unless the defendant also
resides in the forum state. 592 Thus, future mass tort action or steam of commerce cases will stand
no chance at all. 593
In considering the propriety of a State versus a federal forum, the presumption is that the
State courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction unless Congress has explicitly or implicitly reserved
federal court jurisdiction. 594 Viewed in the light of a State long-arm statute and “purposeful
availment” in recent cases, the Court’s guidepost forbids the States to assert jurisdiction under the
long-arm statutes and compromises the States’ sovereign interests and federalism. 595
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McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 880.
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MILLER, supra note 39, at 51 (“State sovereignty involves the authority of a state to define and enforce
its own laws. When a court considers state sovereignty in determining whether there is jurisdiction over a case, the
court attempts to discern whether by deciding the case the court will promoting an interest the state has defined
through its law”).
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McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 882 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 298 (finding that in
McIntyre that expectation was lacking)).
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Id. at 886-87.
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See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 U.S. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
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See id.

593

See id.

594

See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477 (1981) (Powell, J.,); see also McIntyre,
564 U.S. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)-(b) in federal-court suits, whether
resting on diversity or federal-question jurisdiction, venue is proper in the judicial district ‘in which a substantial
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jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concurrent jurisdiction over the cause of
action.”).
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4. Abrogation of “Minimum Contacts” and “Specific Jurisdiction”
As discussed earlier, recent cases point to the Court’s not committing itself to any formula
in the stream of commerce cases. The Court summarized the law that “[i]f the defendant is a
domestic domiciliary, the courts of its home State are available and can exercise general
jurisdiction.” 596 This means that an individual plaintiff must sue a corporate defendant in
defendant’s home State, but if a plaintiff sues a non-resident defendant in the plaintiff’s home
State, then “it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each State has sovereignty that is
not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States. Furthermore, foreign corporations will often
target or concentrate on States, subjecting them to specific jurisdiction in those forums.” 597 The
commission of certain “single or occasional acts” in a State may be sufficient to render a
corporation answerable in that State with respect to those acts, though not with respect to matters
unrelated to the forum connections.” 598 These lines of arguments can be approached from another
direction. Few would dispute the correctness of the argument that the defendant’s forum
connection must not be a “single or occasional act,” but it must be “continuous and systematic
contacts.” Thus, a plaintiff is required to establish “continuous and systematic contact with the
forum State to justify “purposeful availment.” 599 As a textual matter, failure to provide a forum is
also said to infringe a plaintiff’s constitutional rights and the Court is not without notice of this
fact. 600
C. The Stream of Commerce Model in International Transactions
Modern advances in the transportation of products through the international stream of
commerce makes it easier for a foreign corporation (or an orb-web corporation) to reach the United
States markets. It seems reasonably clear that foreign corporations prefer to have their disputes
resolved in their own courts unless they provide otherwise by contract. International stream of
commerce analysis requires only a direct nexus between a cause and prejudice. 601 For example, in
a breach of contract between the two foreign entities, the United Nations Convention on Contracts
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McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion).

597

Id.; but see Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 479.
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McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion).

599

See supra discussion Part I-II; McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 888.

None of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind
of sales effort indicated here is sufficient. Rather, this Court’s previous holdings suggest the
contrary…. And the Court, in separate opinions, has strongly suggested that a single sale of a product
in a State does not constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and
hoping) that such a sale will take place. Id.
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for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) allows a contract to be proved in international trade
court even if the contract was not in writing. 602
In addition, analogous to an individual’s entry into the United States, many federal statutes
and federal agencies regulate entry of products into the United States for sale, and all imported
products are subject to Department of Commerce jurisdiction. 603 Agency determination under the
Tariff Act of 1930 governs this area of law often through Court of International Trade.604
International stream of commerce cases thus remain under the federal courts’ jurisdiction, followed
by the administrative agency determination. 605
V. CONCLUSION
Current personal jurisdiction models and courts’ analyses are inconsistent and unclear in
litigation involving an orb-web corporation. The Court’s proposition is out of accord with the
jurisprudence of clearly established theories or models. Under the rerouted approach argued in this
article, orb-web corporations born in the United States and their foreign subsidiaries can be sued
under the presence model, consistent with the United States Constitution. Likewise, foreign-born,
orb-web corporations’ subsidiaries located in the United States can also be sued under the presence
model as a domestic corporation. Additionally, in stream of commerce cases, jurisdiction may be
asserted depending upon the tribunal’s fact-based determination as discussed above.
This article argues that the rerouted approach of personal jurisdiction will not create new
administrative burdens. Although these approaches may depart from the traditional minimum
contacts model, the minimum contacts model no longer serves the purpose of jurisdictional law;
rather, it creates confusion and wastes judicial resources. Therefore, in future cases, the minimum
contacts analysis should be abrogated from jurisdictional analysis. Based on today’s corporate
structures and forms, application of existing precedents stemming from the pre-industrial era are
unfit and unconstitutional.
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A more thorough discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this article, apart from here
distinguishing two types of stream of commerce cases discussed earlier.

